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**BEFORE THE
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
WASHINGTON, DC 20590**

**Establishment of Slot Exemption Proceeding
At Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport
Pursuant to 49 USC §41718**

Docket
DOT-OST- 2000-7182

Application of JetBlue Airways Corporation

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
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Application of JetBlue Airways Corporation

In response to the Notice¹ of the Department of Transportation (“Department”), JetBlue Airways Corporation (“JetBlue”) hereby applies for the pair of slot exemptions to be reallocated for service at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (“DCA”) to Jacksonville, Florida (“JAX”), pursuant to the provisions of the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (“AIR-21”).² JetBlue proposes to introduce sorely needed competitive service using Stage 3 Embraer E190 jets on a monopoly market presently operated by the dominant carrier at DCA, American Airlines (formerly US Airways).³ JAX is a medium hub airport within DCA’s 1250-mile perimeter that is currently served by a single carrier from DCA. Accordingly, JetBlue’s application responds directly to the Notice and satisfies the criteria Congress has directed the Secretary of Transportation to consider in awarding slot exemptions at DCA.

The Department should award the pair of slot exemptions to JetBlue because its Application provides the maximum competitive benefits for the traveling public. JetBlue’s Application to provide service to a medium hub, Jacksonville, on a high fare, monopoly nonstop

¹ See Notice, Establishment of Slot Exemption Proceeding Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 41718(b), Docket DOT-2000-7182 (March 5, 2014) (the “Notice”).

² See 49 U.S.C. § 41718(b).

³ Unless indicated, references to American Airlines refer to US Airways.

route meets two⁴ of the five congressionally-established decisional criteria. As the Department stated in the Notice, the award of Air 21 slots is not the product of adding up the statutorily-enumerated criteria, but is the result of critical evaluation of those criteria by the Department to arrive at a decision that provides the maximum benefit to the traveling public.⁵

The maximum benefit for the traveling public will be realized by the procompetitive benefits of JetBlue service that have long been recognized and documented by the Department and others. The renowned Massachusetts Institute of Technology International Center on Air Transportation recently completed a study conducted by co-authors Michael Wittman and William Swelbar entitled “Evolving Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impact of Competition, Consolidation, and Low-Cost Carriers” (the “MIT Study”). This study looked at, among other things, the impact of particular air carriers on pricing in various markets and assessed the relative impacts of JetBlue’s and other air carriers’ pricing actions (such as Southwest Airlines) on medium hubs such as JAX.⁶ The findings are directly applicable to the decision presently before the Department in this docket.

⁴ JetBlue meets a third statutory criterion: that the Department award the slot exemption to a limited incumbent air carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 41718(b). Even though JetBlue’s DCA slot portfolio is increasing, it remains a limited incumbent carrier. Congress has defined a limited incumbent as an air carrier that holds or operates fewer than 40 slots at DCA. *See* 49 U.S.C. § 41714(h)(5), as amended by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. JetBlue will not exceed that 40 slot threshold until June 2014. Moreover, even as JetBlue expands its DCA service, it will maintain the low-fare orientation commensurate with the offerings of any new entrant or limited incumbent carrier.

⁵ The Notice indicates that the Department has the discretion to premise an award of slot exemptions on the satisfaction of less than the greatest number of criteria, or even one of the criteria, based on the Department’s analysis of the relative merits of each carrier’s proposal. Notice at 2.

⁶ JetBlue hereby requests that the Department incorporate the MIT Study into the record of this proceeding. The MIT Study is attached as Exhibit B6-2014-103.

As the independent MIT Study establishes, “the presence of JetBlue is one of the most important explanatory factors behind which airports have lower fares than others.”⁷ The MIT Study found that, by 2012, “the presence of JetBlue Airways reduced average one-way airport fares by about \$32,” while the “Southwest effect” had weakened to about \$17.⁸ The dramatic difference in fare impacts is vitally important in this proceeding because markets, like JAX, which are “medium-hub airports[,] have been the hardest hit by increases in fares as airlines [have] removed service and connectivity” due to mergers and capacity discipline.⁹ Although rising air fares in medium-hub markets like JAX are a perfect example of the negative consumer impacts of the recent wave of airline consolidation, the remedy is at hand – the introduction of service from JetBlue.

Indeed, the independent MIT Study found that uniquely JetBlue “is now the airline whose presence is associated with the largest decrease in average fares.”¹⁰ The Department should recognize that the “JetBlue effect” will deliver the greatest competitive benefits.

Another major competitive benefit realized by an award to JetBlue is the significant stimulation of traffic in the city pair where service is provided. Triple digit increases in traffic have been routinely experienced upon JetBlue’s entry. After JetBlue entered the JAX-SJU and BOS-EWR markets, passengers per day, measured from YE 1Q11 to YE 3Q13, increased 410% and 175%, respectively.¹¹ Additional examples of the JetBlue effect can be seen in DCA to

⁷ Michael D. Wittman & William S. Swelbar, Mass. Inst. of Tech. Int’l Center on Air Transp., *Evolving Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impacts of Competition, Consolidation, and Low-Cost Carriers*, Report No. ICAT-2013-07 at 3-4 (Aug. 2013).

⁸ *Id.* at 20 (emphasis added).

⁹ *Id.* at 4.

¹⁰ *Id.* at 20.

¹¹ See DOT O&D Survey, as provided by Diio.

Boston (“BOS”) and DCA to Orlando (“MCO”), where passenger counts increased 90% and 70% between year-end 2010 and the 12-months ending September 30, 2013, respectively.

In addition to lowering fares and growing markets, JetBlue also has introduced its award-winning customer service to DCA. Created after deregulation, JetBlue has achieved consistent profitability and customer loyalty through its commitment to customer service. Since its first flight more than fourteen years ago, its commitment to bring humanity back to air travel has proven far more than a marketing slogan.

JetBlue’s relentless focus on award-winning customer service has been widely acclaimed. The loyalty of its customers, more than 30 million last year, and the dedication of our 15,000 Crewmembers, has enabled JetBlue to receive the prestigious JD Power Award for Customer Satisfaction for an unprecedented ninth year in a row. JetBlue’s customer-centric approach has enabled its profitable growth and allowed JetBlue to become the fastest airline in United States aviation history to achieve the ranks of “major” airline as classified by the Department. A list of JetBlue’s awards is attached as Exhibit B6-2014-101. Because of JetBlue’s documented record of lowering fares, growing markets and providing award-winning customer service, the Department should award the available AIR-21 slot exemption pair to JetBlue Airways because it will maximize the competitive benefits from the reassignment of these slot exemptions.

I. JetBlue’s Proposal

JetBlue proposes to utilize the two available AIR-21 slot exemptions at DCA to compete on the American monopoly route DCA-JAX. JetBlue, within ninety days of a final order awarding such slot exemptions, will begin daily roundtrip nonstop service using the Embraer E190, with 100 seats.

JetBlue’s Proposed Schedule

Origin	Destination	Depart	Arrive	Frequency	Aircraft	Seats	Distance
DCA	JAX	09:15	11:15	Daily	E190	100	634
JAX	DCA	13:10	15:00	Daily	E190	100	634

Although the proposed departure and arrival times do not fall within the same hours as the Republic slot exemptions being reallocated, JetBlue will work with the Department and the FAA on available slot exemption times, consider trades within its slot portfolio, or consider trades with other carriers as needed to operate the DCA-JAX service without imposing any delays at DCA.


II. JetBlue Will Initiate Competitive Service in the DCA-JAX Market Where American Currently Operates a Monopoly.

Since JetBlue’s first flight in 2000, JetBlue has always maintained a very simple formula for deciding which markets to serve—the market needs to be either (1) under-served; (2) over-priced; or (3) both under-served and over-priced. Once JetBlue decides to enter a market, it introduces a meaningful level of service at lower fares than the market has previously experienced. In turn, with the introduction of lower fares, market size increases. The DCA-JAX market will perfectly fit this model.

JetBlue's model has a demonstrably successful history of stimulating demand rather than merely shifting existing traffic. When JetBlue enters a new market, the new capacity generally causes fares to decrease and enplanements to rise. As traffic increases, rather than following the legacy model of increasing fares, JetBlue instead adds capacity, satisfying demand. This historical pattern has been replicated time and time again.


As depicted in the charts below, JetBlue's entry in the DCA-BOS market, then a legacy-carrier, high fare duopoly served by Delta and US Airways, was followed by a 28% reduction in the average one-way fare level from \$173 to \$125. There has been a corresponding increase in the amount of traffic on the route, already one of the nation's busiest; the number of passengers per day has nearly doubled from 761 to 1,444, an increase of almost 90%.

JetBlue's DCA Entry Increased Traffic and Reduced Fares¹²




¹² See DOT O&D Survey, as provided by Diio.

The procompetitive impact of JetBlue’s entry can be observed even before the new service begins. JetBlue recently announced that it will use four of its new slot pairs acquired from the American-US Airways divestiture to serve both Bradley International Airport, which serves Hartford, Connecticut and Springfield, Massachusetts (“BDL”), and Charleston, South Carolina (“CHS”) twice daily from DCA. The reaction of American, the monopoly operator of the only current service, was immediate and to the significant benefit of consumers. As the charts below indicate, advanced purchase fares offered by American immediately dropped 52% in the Bradley market and as much as 73% in the Charleston market.



¹³ Source: ATPCO GFS System (captured Mar. 17, 2014), lowest fare in each advance purchase bucket shown.



JetBlue expects a similar result following its entry into the DCA-JAX market. American's adjusted average fare for DCA-JAX as of year-end 3Q 2013 was \$185.¹⁴ As a result, JetBlue's low fare stimulation model will serve as a powerful catalyst for lower fares and increased enplanements. Accordingly, with the introduction of new low fare competitive service, JetBlue expects that average fares will fall by more than 41% and traffic in the DCA-JAX market will grow by 134,060 passengers in the first year of service.


A. The DCA-JAX Market Is Currently Underserved and Underperforming Due to American's Monopoly.

Today in the DCA-JAX market, American operates five daily nonstop flights in each direction. Although this may appear to be a sufficient level of service, an analysis of American's DCA-JAX commercial strategy demonstrates that the market needs competition. American has served the DCA-JAX market for decades. Historically, this service included three daily nonstops operated with Airbus 319 (124 seats) and Boeing 737 (144 seats), along with occasional regional

¹⁴ DOT O&D Survey via Diio. This calculation of American's average fare, which is explained in detail in columns D-F of Exhibit B6-2014-102, excludes zero fared passengers and includes an estimate of ancillary fees likely charged and collected by American. While American charges \$25 for a first checked bag, JetBlue does not charge for a passenger's first checked bag. While American charges a ticket change fee of \$200, JetBlue charges \$75 to change/cancel any ticket more than 60 days prior to departure date and from \$75 to \$150 to change/cancel a ticket less than 60 days prior to departure, depending on the total cost of the original ticket.

aircraft. Since 2008, American had operated four daily nonstops, but with regional jet Embraer 170 (69-76 seats) and Airbus 319 (124 seats) equipment. American experienced brief interludes of competition when Delta flew the route, first during 2003-2004 and then again in 2010-2012, all with small 50-seat regional jets.¹⁵ Since Delta's exit from the market in early 2012, turning a legacy carrier duopoly into a high fare legacy monopoly route, American has continued operating smaller regional aircraft in a market in which daily nonstop capacity has fallen by nearly 40%. Today, American only operates regional aircraft on this route, flying Embraer 170 (69 seats) and 175 aircraft (80 seats). Considering that the Jacksonville metropolitan area is home to more than 1.3 million people¹⁶ and has a high concentration of government/military installations with a natural nexus to the nation's capital, the level of service and enplanements in this market should be much higher.

Nonstop Seats Per Day in the DCA-JAX Market Have Fallen by 39% Since Delta Exited



Service from other airports in the greater Baltimore-Washington metropolitan area is not a substitute for service from DCA. Although United Airlines offers 3 daily regional jet nonstops

¹⁵ For American and Delta aircraft configurations flown on the route, *see* historical OAG schedules, as provided by Diio.

¹⁶ U.S. Census Bureau, *Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas*, <https://www.census.gov/popest/data/metro/totals/2012/> (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).

from Dulles International Airport (“IAD”) to JAX, service from IAD is not an adequate substitute for DCA for travelers due to its distance (approximately 30 miles) from Washington, DC’s city center. Indeed, in its recent complaint against the merger of US Airways and American Airlines, the United States Department of Justice concluded that: “Airlines do not view service at other airports as adequate substitutes for service offered at Reagan National for certain passengers”¹⁷ Moreover, the Department also has concluded that “BWI and IAD are not economically interchangeable with DCA.” Order 2012-7-26 at 18 (July 24, 2012).

B. The Lack of Competition Has Resulted in Higher Than Average Fares and Lower Capacity.

When competition existed in the DCA-JAX market, as described above, there were nearly 200 more seats available per day. American is presently flying smaller aircraft to babysit its mainline, large jet slots and take advantage of this monopoly route to the detriment of the traveling public.¹⁸ Although the average DCA-JAX fare just recently returned to levels present when Delta competed against American, the fare is still well above the average fare for routes of similar distance from DCA with meaningful competition.

A comparison of fares in the DCA-JAX market to competitive DCA routes of a similar distance demonstrates the monopoly premium that American charges on the route. Further, on other JetBlue nonstop DCA-Florida markets of similar, and even longer, stage length such as DCA to Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood (“FLL”), Orlando (“MCO”) and Tampa (“TPA”), JetBlue’s coach fare structures are significantly lower, in all categories, than incumbent carrier American

¹⁷ Complaint at ¶ 31, *United States v. US Airways Group, Inc.*, Case No. 1:13-cv-01236 (D.D.C. Aug 13, 2013).

¹⁸ Slots at DCA are divided into two categories: “air carrier” slots available to any type of aircraft, and “commuter” slots that are restricted to smaller aircraft. Since the Delta-US Airways slot swap, American has increasingly used commuter-sized aircraft in its “air carrier” slots, greatly reducing capacity and wasting these scarce resources.

on the DCA-JAX route, as demonstrated in the chart below. Furthermore, compared to American's pricing model of requiring round-trip travel, JetBlue offers its lowest fares even to customers who choose to purchase one-way tickets.


Fare Type ¹⁹	American (AA)		JetBlue (B6)			
	DCA-JAX (634 mi)	% higher than B6 average	DCA-MCO (759 mi)	DCA-TPA (814 mi)	DCA-FLL (899 mi)	Average
14 day Advance Purchase	\$179 ¹	85%	\$111	\$78	\$100	\$96
7 day Advance Purchase	\$352 ¹	148%	\$124	\$135	\$166	\$142
0 day Advance Purchase	\$509 ¹	93%	\$283	\$235	\$272	\$263

¹ Only sold as round-trip

Worse yet, American's filed fares for government travel are up to 60% higher than the average fare JetBlue offers for government business on other DCA-Florida routes of longer stage lengths. Given the numerous governmental ties between Jacksonville and the nation's capital, allowing JetBlue to serve DCA-JAX will not only lower fares for the general public, but also reduce taxpayer expense. As further evidence, JetBlue's entry into the DCA-Florida markets has stimulated traffic and reduced average fares. For example, when JetBlue entered the DCA-TPA market, fares fell by 19% and traffic grew by 36%.

¹⁹ Source: ATPCO GFS System (captured Mar. 24, 2014).

JetBlue's Entry Has Reduced Fares and Stimulated Traffic Between DCA and Tampa




III. Granting JetBlue's Application to Serve DCA-JAX Will Produce the Maximum Competitive Benefits.

A. JetBlue's Proposed DCA-JAX Service Will Generate \$14.8 Million Annually in Consumer Fare Savings and Stimulate 134,060 New DCA-JAX Passengers.

In keeping with its model of introducing high quality, low fare competition on monopoly routes, JetBlue proposes an average one-way, nonstop fare of \$110, which is approximately 41% lower than American's current average one-way fare of \$185.²⁰


²⁰ DOT O&D Survey via Diio, trailing four quarter data (captured March 22, 2014).

JetBlue’s Projected DCA-JAX Fare Will Be 41% Less Than American’s Current Fare²¹




Consistent with JetBlue’s experience in other markets, JetBlue’s traffic model predicts that its lower fares will stimulate a total of 134,060 new passengers (58,400 on JetBlue and 75,600 on American) in the first year of service. As JetBlue has done in many other markets, JetBlue will upgauge its equipment to right size its aircraft as demand warrants.

JetBlue’s Proposed DCA-JAX Service Will Stimulate Over 134,060 New Enplanements



²¹ DOT O&D Survey via Diio, trailing four quarter data as of YE 3Q 2013 (captured March 22, 2014). Average fare excludes zero fare passengers, taxes, and governmental fees, and includes an estimate of baggage and rebooking/change fees.

The introduction of low fare competition in the DCA-JAX market will result in significant consumer benefit, an estimated \$14.8 million annually in consumer fare savings.



As the MIT Study demonstrated, no other air carrier presently has the ability to lower fares like JetBlue.

B. JetBlue Is Dedicated to Competing Against American, Still DCA's Dominant Carrier

Despite a decade's worth of failed attempts to enter the artificially-constrained DCA market, JetBlue's presence today reflects its willingness to persevere and compete head-to-head with the dominant carrier at DCA and with other carriers such as Southwest. JetBlue began its DCA operations in November 2010, when it obtained a limited number of slots through a commercial transaction with American (prior to the US Airways merger). JetBlue later expanded that service by spending more than \$40 million to acquire 8 slot pairs in a Department-mandated and supervised auction ordered in connection with the US Airways-Delta Air Lines

²² JetBlue calculated consumer fare savings in accordance with the consumer surplus method outlined by the FAA in "FAA Airport Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance," Office of Aviation Policy and Planning, Federal Aviation Administration (Dec. 15, 1999).

“slot swap.”²³ JetBlue’s winning bid of more than \$40 million was nearly 24% more than the next highest bidder, demonstrating JetBlue’s commitment to grow its low fare, award-winning service at DCA.²⁴ Since then, JetBlue has expanded service at DCA modestly until recently, when it entered into an agreement to obtain 12 new slot pairs from American as a result of the divestiture ordered in connection with American’s merger with US Airways.

As JetBlue has made significant capital investments to grow its presence at DCA, JetBlue has used its DCA slot portfolio to introduce meaningful competition, especially against DCA’s dominant legacy carrier, American, rather than fly to markets that have no competition. JetBlue recently announced that it planned to use 6 of its 12 new forthcoming slot pairs to compete head-to-head with American in the DCA-CHS and DCA-BDL markets, serving both twice daily; to backfill service to Nassau, Bahamas²⁵ that American canceled; and to meet growing market demand by adding a second daily flight to Tampa, Florida.²⁶


As a result of this newly-announced service, by mid-2014 JetBlue will offer 24 daily roundtrip flights from DCA to the following eight cities: Boston, Charleston, Hartford, Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood, Nassau, Orlando, and Tampa, as well as the only nonstop service to San Juan, Puerto Rico. The charts below show JetBlue’s growing presence at DCA before and after it obtained the 12 new slot pairs as a result of the divestiture from American.

²³ See Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia Airport, 76 Fed. Reg. 63,702 (Oct. 13, 2011).

²⁴ Federal Aviation Administration, Slot Reallocation Final Bid Information with Bidder ID Assignments for DCA Bundle (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/agc/ReAllocation/DCABids/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).

²⁵ Subject to receipt of government operating authority.

²⁶ Press Release, JetBlue Airways Corp., JetBlue Adds Three Nonstop Destinations for Customers at Ronald Reagan Washington Nat’l Airport, Offers Introductory One-Way Fares as Low as \$30 (Mar. 6, 2014), *available at* <http://investor.jetblue.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=131045&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1906649&highlight=>.



The proposed service to JAX²⁷ is a continuation of JetBlue’s carefully planned growth strategy that will specifically address a market sorely in need of low fare competition.

C. JetBlue’s Entry and Expanding Service Has Benefited DCA Travelers.

JetBlue’s entry and expansion at DCA has significantly benefited DCA consumers. Indeed, in announcing the settlement of the US Airways-American merger litigation, William Baer, the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, expressly referred to the procompetitive impact of JetBlue’s entry at DCA: “A few years ago, when JetBlue started service from Reagan National, prices to Boston dropped 30 percent and consumers saved \$50 million per year.”²⁸

The Department has similarly recognized the benefits:

JetBlue recently began operations at DCA via a lease of slots from American and one pair of allocated slots from FAA, in 2010, and plans to expand its operations


²⁷ In addition to another 6 daily frequencies from DCA to markets yet to be announced.

²⁸ Press Release, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer at Conference Call Regarding the Justice Department’s Proposed Settlement with US Airways and American Airlines (Nov. 12, 2013), *available at* http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2013/301626.htm.

in June, utilizing the slots it purchased from Delta in 2011. Although its time in DCA has been short and its scope of nonstop services is limited, initial data indicate that JetBlue, an established low-fare carrier, has generated positive competitive discipline in the DCA markets it serves, as it has rapidly gained passenger share, while at the same time recording average fares below the respective incumbent carriers.²⁹

Similarly, JetBlue’s entry into DCA-MCO and DCA-FLL also has led to increases in traffic on the routes. As depicted below, traffic has increased by 70% on the DCA-MCO route and 8% on the DCA-FLL route.

JetBlue’s Entry Has Stimulated Traffic Between DCA and Florida³⁰



Low fare new entry, *especially on monopoly routes held by legacy carriers*, is unquestionably beneficial to the travelling public and precisely what the Department should be, as Congress directed, focusing on with scarce resources such as AIR-21 slots. As the Department has

²⁹ Order 2012-5-12 at 19-20 (May 14, 2012) (awarding JetBlue beyond-perimeter slot exemptions to serve San Juan).
³⁰ See DOT O&D Survey via Diio, YE 3Q 2013 data.

recognized, the addition of “competitive nonstop air transportation on a monopoly nonstop route to DCA . . . would be expected to have an immediate competitive impact on fares in that market”³¹ JetBlue seeks to expand at DCA with its proposed Jacksonville service.³² As the MIT Study explained, no other air carrier lowers air fares to the degree JetBlue does, nor can any other carrier provide the benefits to the traveling public as documented with JetBlue service.

IV. Jacksonville Is a Growing, Diversified Metropolitan Area Requiring More Frequent and Affordable Service to DCA.

Jacksonville, with a metropolitan population of over 1,377,000 people,³³ is a growing and thriving market with a diversified economy. With a steadily increasing population, Jacksonville is a major intermodal transportation hub. Jacksonville has a thriving port for both domestic and international shipping and the cruise ship industry. Many major colleges and universities, including the University of Florida, Florida State University, Florida A & M and Bethune-Cookman University, which serve more than 230,000 students, fall within Jacksonville’s catchment area. These institutions include research universities with government grants requiring interface with federal agencies. Jacksonville is also a major East Coast center of military operations, including the Jacksonville Naval Air Station, Mayport Naval Base, Kings Bay Submarine Base and the Florida National Guard Headquarters, as well as other military

³¹ DOT Order 2010-12-16 at 11 (Dec. 10, 2010).

³² See Notice on Petition for Waiver of the Terms of the Order Limiting Scheduled Operations at LaGuardia Airport, 75 Fed. Reg. 26,322, 26,330 (May 11, 2010) (“DOT believes that, as a general rule, in the aviation industry more competitive pressure and pricing discipline can be exerted by low-cost carriers than by incumbent legacy carriers. This view is supported by the Department of Justice, as well as in the academic literature cited in the Notice and by DOJ in its Appendix A. . . . As stated in the Notice, studies indicate that entry by low-cost carriers dramatically lowers fares and increases the volume of passengers in a market”) (citing Comments of the United States Department of Justice, FAA Docket No. 2010-0109 (Mar. 24, 2010), at 4 & the studies cited therein).

³³ U.S. Census Bureau, *Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas*, <https://www.census.gov/popest/data/metro/totals/2012/> (last visited Mar. 25, 2014).

installations. These multifaceted connections between the Jacksonville area and the federal government require travel between the region and the preferred airport in the nation's capital, DCA, and the U.S. tax payer deserves to see the documented benefit of lower fares that comes with JetBlue service.

Jacksonville is also a regional medical hub, a center for financial and professional services, and a tourist destination. Golf is major attraction in the Jacksonville area, and the city is home to the Professional Golfers Association ("PGA") Tour Headquarters. Based on this diversified economy, Jacksonville enjoys a higher median household income and a lower unemployment rate than the rest of the state of Florida. Traffic at the Jacksonville International Airport is very stable with minimal seasonality. All of these attributes suggest a strong need for additional service to DCA, yet quite the opposite has happened as American has consistently downsized and decreased capacity since Delta's exit from the market.

V. JetBlue's Application Satisfies the Statutory Criteria of 49 U.S.C. § 41718(b) That the Department Must Consider in Exemption Proceedings.

In 49 U.S.C. § 41718(b), Congress established statutory criteria to direct the Department's decision in slot exemption proceedings. The Notice provided the following statement of those five criteria:

the Secretary [shall] distribute within-perimeter slot exemptions in a manner that promotes air transportation: (1) by new entrant air carriers and limited incumbent air carriers; (2) to communities without existing nonstop air transportation to DCA; (3) to small communities; (4) that will provide competitive nonstop air transportation on a monopoly nonstop route to DCA; or (5) that will produce the maximum competitive benefits, including low fares.

Notice at 2. JetBlue's proposed DCA-JAX service satisfies the fourth and, most importantly, the fifth of these criteria in a manner that provides maximum public benefits.³⁴ Indeed, the Notice contemplates that the Department may premise an award of slot exemptions on the satisfaction of less than the greatest number of criteria, or even one of the criteria, based on the Department's analysis of the relative merits of each carrier's proposal.³⁵

A. JetBlue Will Provide Competitive Nonstop Air Transportation on a Monopoly Nonstop Route.

As discussed at length in Section II, the grant of JetBlue's application will introduce competition on a significant route where American has a monopoly. In Department proceedings, the introduction of competition in a monopoly market has been a primary justification for the award of slot exemptions.³⁶

B. JetBlue Will Maximize Competitive Benefits and Low Fares.

As discussed in Section III, JetBlue's proposed DCA-JAX service will have significant competitive benefits. The Department has explained that "maximum competitive benefits, including low fares" means to exert downward pressure on fares.³⁷ JetBlue forecasts that fares will be reduced by 41% and traffic will be stimulated by 93%. As the Department stated in its most recent slot exemption order, Order 2013-5-6, the most significant criterion in awarding those slots was the promotion of maximum competitive benefits, including low fares. The American monopoly service inflicts a significant cost on the traveling public in the form of higher fares and reduced service. This harm can only be remedied by facilitating more

³⁴ As discussed in footnote 4, *supra*, JetBlue technically satisfies the first criterion that the Department consider awarding the slot exemptions to a limited incumbent air carrier. JetBlue's slot portfolio at DCA does not presently exceed 40 slots and will not do so until June of 2014.

³⁵ Notice at 2.

³⁶ See, e.g., Order 2000-7-2 at 20 (Jul. 5, 2000) (awarding slot exemptions to Spirit to facilitate its proposal to provide "competitive nonstop air transportation on DCA monopoly nonstop routes by offering low-fare service to compete with US Airways' monopoly").

³⁷ Order 2008-12-22 at 4 (2008).

competition, which the Department has the opportunity to do in this proceeding by selecting JetBlue.

C. The Criteria JetBlue Does Not Satisfy Are of Secondary Importance Given the Benefits of JetBlue's Proposed DCA-JAX Service.

Criterion 2 (service to communities without DCA service) is mutually exclusive with criterion 4 (introducing competition on a monopoly route). Given the potential size of the DCA-JAX market, where JetBlue proposes to introduce initial service with a 100-seat aircraft and upgauge as demand warrants, the public benefit will be maximized by introducing more capacity, more choice, and more service at a lower cost. Although JetBlue does not propose to serve a small community, that factor is outweighed by the fact that JetBlue will introduce competition on a route where a significant number of travelers will benefit.

VI. Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, JetBlue respectfully requests that the Department grant its application for two slot exemptions to facilitate its new competitive service between DCA and JAX.

Dated: March 25, 2014

Respectfully submitted,



Robert C. Land
Senior Vice President for Government Affairs
And Associate General Counsel

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LIST OF JETBLUE AWARDS

Year	Award	Source
2014	Airline Technology Leader of the Year	<i>Air Transport World</i>
2013	International Airline Award – Best Service	<i>Jamaica Hotel & Tourist Association</i>
2013	Most Innovative Users of Business Technology	<i>Information Week</i>
2013	Top Low Cost Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>JD Power and Associates</i>
2013	Best Terminal Experience / Friendliest Terminal / Best Terminal for Cleanliness and Condition / Best Concessions – JFK T5	<i>Port Authority of New York & New Jersey Customer Care Awards</i>
2012	Best Places to Work	<i>Glassdoor</i>
2012	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Porthole Cruise Magazine award</i>
2012	Best Innovative Consumer Experience Concept or Practice - Live From T5 Concert Series	<i>Airports Council International-North America (ACI-NA)</i>
2012	Ten Best Travel Apps of 2012	<i>SmarterTravel</i>
2012	The new jetblue.com – Best in Class, Gold Aware	<i>W³ Awards, The Interactive Media Awards</i>
2012	Best of the Web Mobile Leaders	<i>Compuware</i>
2012	Top Low Cost Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>JD Power and Associates</i>
2011	Best Airline	<i>Logo TV's NewNowNext Travel Awards</i>
2011	Best Airline Website Booking Experience	<i>U.S. Air Travelers' Choice Award</i>
2011	Best U.S. Budget Airline	<i>About.com</i>
2011	Excellent Web Service 2010	<i>Compuware Gomez Web & Mobile Performance Awards</i>
2011	Best Value Airline (Domestic), Most Customer Friendly Airline, and Best Coach Class Experience	<i>Travel 2011 Editor's Choice Awards</i>
2011	Top Low Cost Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>JD Power and Associates</i>
2010	Top Low Cost Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>JD Power and Associates</i>

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Year	Award	Source
2010	Spot on list of Top Technology Innovators Across America	<i>Information Week 500</i>
2010	Top Rated Large Domestic Airline' for Economy and 'Best In-flight Entertainment' for Domestic Flights	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2010	Best Cabin Ambiance	<i>Passenger Choice Awards, Airline Passenger Experience Association (APEX)</i>
2010	#1 Airline Brand	<i>2010 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2010	CIO 100 Award Honoree	<i>CIO Magazine</i>
2010	Best Concessions Program Design (T5/JFK)	<i>ARN's Best Airport and Concessionaires Awards</i>
2010	Most Unique Services (T5/JFK)	<i>ARN's Best Airport and Concessionaires Awards</i>
2010	Best Overall Concessions Program (T5/JFK)	<i>ARN's Best Airport and Concessionaires Awards</i>
2010	Best Concessions Management Team (T5/JFK)	<i>ARN's Best Airport and Concessionaires Awards</i>
2010	Best Coach-Class Experience	<i>SmarterTravel Editors' Choice Awards</i>
2010	Most Customer-Friendly Airline	<i>SmarterTravel Editors' Choice Awards</i>
2010	Most Pet-Friendly Airline for Carry-on Pets	<i>SmarterTravel Editors' Choice Awards</i>
2009	Best Airline Brand	<i>2009 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2009	Best Environmental Campaign - Jetting to Green	<i>Cause Marketing Forum</i>
2009	Best Rated Large Domestic Airline in the Economy Category	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2009	#1 Airline Brand	<i>2009 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2009	Richard A. Griesbach Award of Excellence Winner	<i>ACI-NA 2009 Airport Concessions</i>
2009	#1 U.S. Routes/Single-Class Service Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler</i>
2009	Top-Rated Large Domestic Airline - Economy Seating	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2009	Best In-Flight Entertainment - Domestic	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2009	5th Annual Extra Miles Awards	<i>Budget Travel Magazine</i>
2009	CIO 100 Award Honoree	<i>CIO Magazine</i>
2009	Top Low Cost Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>J.D. Power and Associates</i>
2009	AIGA Corporate Leadership Award	<i>AIGA - The Professional Association for Design</i>
2008	Best Large U.S. Economy Class	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2008	Best Inflight Entertainment	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2008	Most Eco-Friendly	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2008	Silver Halo- Best Environmental Campaign - Jetting to Green	<i>Cause Marketing Forum</i>
2008	Best In-Seat Comfort	<i>SmarterTravel Readers' Choice Awards</i>

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Year	Award	Source
2008	Best Onboard Entertainment, Domestic Airline	<i>SmarterTravel 2008 Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2008	Top Low Cost Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>J.D. Power and Associates</i>
2007	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2007	Top Low Cost Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>J.D. Power and Associates</i>
2007	Best North American Low Cost Airline	<i>Skytrax World Airline Awards</i>
2007	World's Most Reliable A320 Fleet	<i>Airbus Operational Excellence Awards</i>
2007	#1 Airline Brand	<i>2007 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2007	Best Low Cost/No Frills Airline	<i>OAG, 2007 Airline of the Year Awards</i>
2007	Leading Provider of Domestic Airfare Deals	<i>Travelzoo Awards</i>
2007	Best U.S. Airline	<i>Airline Quality Ranking Survey</i>
2007	#2 rated airline	<i>University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute and W. Frank Barton School of Business at Wichita State University</i>
2007	Best Domestic Airline for Value	<i>Travel + Leisure, World's Best Values Awards</i>
2007	Most Admired Companies	<i>Fortune magazine, #3 rated airline</i>
2007	Best Airline for Customer Satisfaction	<i>Market Metrix</i>
2006	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler, Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2006	Extra Mile Award (shut-eye/snack bar services)	<i>Frommer's Budget Travel</i>
2006	Top U.S. Airline for Consumer Demand	<i>Kanbay Research Institute 2006 Travel Demand Today Report</i>
2006	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Travel + Leisure World's Best Values Awards</i>
2006	Best Domestic Airline for Value	<i>Travel + Leisure, 2006 World's Best Values Awards</i>
2006	#1 Airline Brand	<i>2006 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2006	Highest Low-Cost Carrier Customer Satisfaction	<i>J.D. Power and Associates</i>
2006	Best U.S. Airline	<i>Airline Quality Ranking Survey, University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute and W. Frank Barton School of Business at Wichita State University</i>
2006	Best Low Cost/No Frills Airline	<i>OAG Airline of the Year Awards</i>
2006	Best Airline Value	<i>Entrepreneur Magazine</i>
2006	Passenger Service Award	<i>Air Transport World Magazine</i>
2005	Best Value for Cost	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Business Travel Awards</i>
2005	Best Low-Cost Carrier	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Business Travel Awards</i>
2005	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2005	Best Airline for Economy Class	<i>Global Traveler magazine</i>

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Year	Award	Source
2005	Best Low-Cost Carrier	<i>Global Traveler magazine</i>
2005	#1 Airline Brand	<i>2005 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2005	#2 Domestic Airline	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2005	Great Gay Marketing Award	<i>Out & About Travel Magazine Travel Awards</i>
2005	#10 Top Performing Medium Airline	<i>Aviation Week & Space Technology Magazine Top-Performing Companies</i>
2005	#17 Most Improved Medium Airline	<i>Aviation Week & Space Technology Magazine, 2005 Top-Performing Companies</i>
2005	#47 & 48 Reasons to Love Your Country	<i>GQ Magazine, "62 Reasons to Love Your Country"</i>
2005	Silver Award (JetBlue's Self-Service Check-In Kiosk)	<i>Business Week Magazine, 2005 Annual Design Awards</i>
2005	#25 JetBlue/Sky's The Limit	<i>Wired Magazine, The Wired 40 "masters of technology and innovation"</i>
2005	Best Branding	<i>The Association of Travel Marketing Executives (ATME), 2005 Atlas Awards</i>
2005	World's Best Low-Cost Airline	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2005	#2 Airline in North America	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2005	Top-Hospitality Airline	<i>Market Metrix Hospitality Index</i>
2005	Best Airline Quality	<i>The Wall Street Journal Airline Quality Survey</i>
2005	Best Airline Service	<i>The Associated Press, 2005 Annual Survey</i>
2005	Corporate Community Partnership Award	<i>American Red Cross</i>
2005	Best U.S. Airline Customer Satisfaction	<i>J.D. Power and Associates</i>
2005	Best Domestic Airline	<i>North American Travel Journalists Association</i>
2005	Best Value for Cost	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Business Travel Awards</i>
2005	Great Gay Marketing Award	<i>Out & About Travel Magazine Travel Awards</i>
2005	#10 Top Performing Medium Airline	<i>Aviation Week & Space Technology Magazine Top-Performing Companies</i>
2005	#17 Most Improved Medium Airline	<i>Aviation Week & Space Technology Magazine Top-Performing Companies</i>
2005	Silver Award (JetBlue's Self-Service Check-In Kiosk)	<i>Business Week Magazine Annual Design Awards</i>
2005	JetBlue/Sky's The Limit	<i>Wired Magazine, The 40 "masters of technology and innovation"</i>
2005	Best Branding	<i>The Association of Travel Marketing Executives (ATME) Atlas Awards</i>
2005	World's Best Low-Cost Airline	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2005	#2 Airline in North America	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2005	Top-Hospitality Airline	<i>Market Metrix Hospitality Index</i>
2005	Best Airline Quality	<i>The Wall Street Journal Airline Quality Survey</i>
2005	Best Airline Service	<i>The Associated Press Annual Survey</i>
2005	Corporate Community Partnership Award	<i>American Red Cross</i>

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Year	Award	Source
2005	Best U.S. Airline	<i>Airline Quality Ranking Survey, University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute and W. Frank Barton School of Business at Wichita State University</i>
2005	Best U.S. Airline Customer Satisfaction	<i>J.D. Power and Associates Reports, 2005 Airline Satisfaction Index Study</i>
2005	Best Domestic Airline	<i>North American Travel Journalists Association</i>
2004	#1 Airline Brand	<i>2004 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2004	Best U.S. Service	<i>Business 2.0, 2004 Omaha Aviation Institute's Quality Ranking Survey</i>
2004	Best Corporate Service	<i>USTA/Eastern Corporate Service</i>
2004	Best U.S. Airline	<i>Airline Quality Ranking Survey, University of Nebraska at Omaha Aviation Institute and W. Frank Barton School of Business at Wichita State University</i>
2004	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler, 2004 Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2004	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Business Travel Awards</i>
2004	Best Value for Cost	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Business Travel Awards</i>
2004	#2 Domestic Airline	<i>Travel & Leisure World's Best Awards</i>
2004	#2 Domestic Airline Service	<i>Travel & Leisure World's Best Service Readers' Poll Awards</i>
2004	Best Domestic Airline	<i>North American Travel Journalists Association, 5-Star Award</i>
2004	North America's Leading Budget Airline	<i>11th Annual World Travel Awards</i>
2004	Top 5 Domestic Airline	<i>Departures Readers' Favorite Survey</i>
2004	Best Low Cost Carrier in the World	<i>Global Traveler Magazine</i>
2004	Best Low Cost Carrier (Second Place)	<i>Executive Travel Magazine</i>
2004	Best in Executive Travel	<i>Executive Travel Magazine</i>
2004	Airline Excellence Award, North America	<i>Skytrax, 2004 Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2004	Best Low Cost Airline	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2004	Best Cabin Staff, North America	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2004	Best Airline	<i>New York Press, Best of Manhattan Readers' Poll</i>
2004	Favorite U.S. Airline	<i>Salon.com, Readers' Choice</i>
2004	Most Wanted List	<i>Gotham</i>
2004	Best Company in North America	<i>Global Finance Magazine</i>
2004	Best CFO (John Owen)	<i>Institutional Investor Magazine</i>
2004	Airline Customer Loyalty Award	<i>Brandweek</i>
2004	Corporate Service Award	<i>United States Tennis Association, Eastern Corporate Service Award</i>
2003	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler, 2003 Readers' Choice Awards</i>

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Year	Award	Source
2003	Best Value for Cost	<i>Condé Nast Traveler, 2003 Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2003	Best Domestic Airline	<i>North American Travel Journalists Association, Five-Star Award</i>
2003	#1 Airline Brand	<i>Brand Keys Customer Loyalty Engagement Index</i>
2003	#2 Domestic Airline	<i>Travel & Leisure World's Best Awards</i>
2003	Top 5 Domestic Airline	<i>Departures, Readers' Favorite Survey</i>
2003	#3 World's Best Low Cost Airline (Best U.S. Low Cost Airline)	<i>Business Traveler World's Best Airlines Awards</i>
2003	Best Budget Airline	<i>10th Annual World Travel Awards</i>
2003	Best US Airline (Non-Major)	<i>Business Travel News Airline Survey</i>
2003	Best Low Cost Airline	<i>Entrepreneur Magazine</i>
2003	Best Low Cost Airline	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2003	Best Cabin Staff, North America	<i>Skytrax Airline of the Year Survey</i>
2003	Airline of the Year	<i>Airfinance Journal Deal of the Year</i>
2003	North American Corporate Finance Deal of the Year	<i>Airfinance Journal Deal of the Year</i>
2003	Airline Customer Loyalty Award	<i>Brandweek</i>
2003	IPO of the Year	<i>Corporate Finance Magazine</i>
2003	Marketing Award	<i>Airline Business Strategy Award</i>
2003	Editors' Choice	<i>Travel-Holiday</i>
2003	Outstanding Inflight Entertainment	<i>Onboard Services Onboard Services Awards</i>
2003	Outstanding Safety Video	<i>Onboard Services Onboard Services Awards</i>
2002	Best Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler, 2002 Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2002	Best Domestic Airline, coach	<i>Condé Nast Traveler, 2002 Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2002	Best Domestic Airline, Value For Cost	<i>Condé Nast Traveler, 2002 Readers' Choice Awards</i>
2002	Best Domestic Airline	<i>North American Travel Journalists Association, Five-Star Award</i>
2002	#2 Domestic Airline	<i>Travel and Leisure, 2002 World's Best Awards</i>
2002	Best Low-Cost Carrier (Runner-Up)	<i>Business Traveler Best in Business Travel Awards</i>
2002	"It" Airline	<i>Entertainment Weekly It List</i>
2002	Editor's Choice	<i>Worth</i>
2002	Marketer of the Year	<i>Advertising Age</i>
2002	#4 Brand of the Year	<i>brandchannel.com, 2002 Readers' Choice</i>
2002	Finance Award	<i>Airline Business Airline Strategy Awards</i>
2002	Market Development Award	<i>Air Transport World Industry Achievement Awards</i>
2002	Best Overall Airline	<i>Onboard Services Onboard Service Awards</i>

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Year	Award	Source
2002	Best Inflight or Onboard Service	<i>Onboard Services Onboard Service Awards</i>
2002	Best Onboard Entertainment	<i>Onboard Services Onboard Service Awards</i>
2002	Best Uniforms (2nd Place)	<i>Onboard Services, 2002 Onboard Service Awards</i>
2001	Best Domestic Airline, Coach	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Business Travel Awards</i>
2001	Best Domestic Airline	<i>North American Travel Journalists Association, Five-Star Award</i>
2001	#2 Domestic Airline	<i>Condé Nast Traveler Reader's Choice Awards</i>
2001	#2 Domestic Airline	<i>Zagat Airline Survey</i>
2001	Best New Airline	<i>Money</i>
2001	Favorite U.S. Airline	<i>Orange County Register/Knight Ridder</i>
2001	Seal of Approval	<i>Diversions</i>
2001	"A" Rating	<i>Planetfeedback</i>
2001	#2 Airline	<i>Epinions.com</i>
2000	"It" Airline	<i>Vanity Fair It List</i>

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Fare Stimulation Calculations

Market	(A) Miles	(B) Passengers Before Stimulation	(C) Predicted Service Stimulation (revenue)	(D) Average Fare Before B6				(E) Fare Stimulation				(F) Fare Change				(G) Consumer Surplus			
				Base Fare	Fees	Total	Projected B6 Fare	Projected B6 Fare	Absolute	%	Pax After Stimulation	New Pax	Existing Pax	New Pax	Total Consumer Surplus	Existing Pax	New Pax	Total Consumer Surplus	
DCA-JAX	634	140,419	20%	\$169.28	\$15.40	\$184.68	\$110	\$110	(\$75)	(41%)	274,479	134,060	\$10.0M	\$4.8M	\$14.8M				

(A) Nonstop miles

(B) Total fared passengers as of YE 3Q 2013 (DOT O&D Survey via Diio), excludes 4.3% of passengers on zero fare tickets

(C) Conservative estimate of market revenue stimulation based on JetBlue's track record

(D) Total DCA-JAX revenue as of YE 3Q 2013 (DOT O&D Survey via Diio) / (B)

(E) 9.1% estimate of ancillary baggage and cancellation fees (DOT Form 41 via Diio) * (D)

(F) (D) + (E)

(G) Projected JetBlue average fare in year 1 based on comparable DCA markets, includes 4.4% ancillary fee estimate (DOT Form 41 via Diio)

(H) (G) - (F)

(I) (H) / (F)

(J) (B) * (F) * (1 + (C))


(K) (J) - (B)

(L) (B) * [(F) - M_e], where M_e is the new equilibrium price of \$113, assuming AA matches B6 fare, weighted by expected market share, plus ancillary fee estimate (DOT Form 41 via Diio)

(M) (K) * [(F) - M_e] * 0.5, follows method outlined by the FAA in "FAA Airport Benefit-Cost Analysis Guidance", Office of Aviation Policy and Planning, FAA, Dec. 15, 1999

(N) (L) + (M)

EXHIBIT B6-2014-103
MIT International Center for Air Transportation White Paper



**EVOLVING TRENDS OF U.S. DOMESTIC AIRFARES:
THE IMPACTS OF COMPETITION, CONSOLIDATION,
AND LOW-COST CARRIERS**

Michael D. Wittman and William S. Swelbar
MIT International Center for Air Transportation

MIT Small Community Air Service White Paper No. 3
Report No. ICAT-2013-07
August 2013

MIT International Center for Air Transportation (ICAT)
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Introduction to paper series

This report, *Evolving Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares: The Impacts of Competition, Consolidation, and Low-Cost Carriers*, is the third in a series of papers written under the umbrella of the MIT Small Community Air Service White Paper series. The aim of the paper series is to examine and analyze the past, current, and anticipated future trends of small community air service in the United States. The series is intended for a general audience of airline and airport executives, aviation policy makers, the news media, and anyone with an interest in the evolution of commercial air service at the nation's smaller airports. The authors of this paper series hope that these reports will serve to inform the policy debate with relevant and accurate statistical analysis, such that those responsible for deciding the future of small community air service will do so armed with factual basis for their actions.

The authors of the MIT Small Community Air Service White Paper series are members of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's International Center for Air Transportation, one of the nation's premier centers for aviation, airline, and airport research. Financial support for study authors has been provided in part by the MIT Airline Industry Consortium, an interdisciplinary group of airlines, airport councils, manufacturers, suppliers, policy makers, and advocacy groups dedicated to improving the state of the practice of air transportation research in the United States. However, any views or analyses presented in this and all future reports are the sole opinions of the authors and do not reflect the positions of MIT Airline Industry Consortium members or MIT.

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Executive Summary

Economic theory suggests that prices of goods and services may rise as a result of “supply shocks” such as increases in net input prices. In the U.S., the airline industry has met with a number of such “shocks” since 2007, from high and volatile fuel prices (which increased by 57% from 2007-2012, according to the MIT Airline Data Project) to a global economic downturn. Additionally, airlines have pursued conservative capacity strategies in recent years in an attempt to regain profitability, putting further upward pressure on prices. In all, these supply shocks and disciplined capacity management resulted in a 14.3% reduction in scheduled domestic flights in the U.S. from 2007-2012. Theoretically, we would expect airfares to also increase over the same period, adjusting for inflation. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether average airfares have indeed increased at U.S. airports over the last six years.

Through an analysis of ticket data, we find that average one-way airfares at the 29 largest airports in the U.S. increased by 8.7% on average from 2007-2012, adjusting for inflation. Average inflation-adjusted one-way airfares at 35 mid-sized airports increased by 11.9% on average over the same period. Some airports saw increases in airfares of over 20%, while others saw net decreases in average fares. As economic theory would suggest, airports that gained many new flights over the study period were more likely to see their average fares fall. For instance, at San Francisco International Airport (SFO)—where domestic departures increased by 20.9% from 2007-2012—fares decreased by 4% over the same period.

We also investigate how airfares changed in regions with multiple airports. In our earlier report on domestic capacity¹, we found that airlines were consolidating service at larger airports in multi-airport regions while restricting capacity at the smaller airports in those regions. Similarly, in many multi-airport regions, we find that average fares at smaller airports increased by a greater percentage than fares at the larger airports in those regions. This behavior is likely explained in part by recent capacity reduction decisions by Southwest Airlines, which has a significant presence at many secondary airports, as well as network carriers cutting redundant flying to secondary hubs.

Finally, we examine the effect of the presence of low-cost carriers on average fares at 445 U.S. airports. Much research has been done on the famous “Southwest effect,” which suggests that passenger traffic increases and fares decrease once Southwest Airlines enters a market. Previous research has shown that entry by Southwest (or even the threat of entry) has the potential to decrease fares in both directly-competing and adjacent markets.²

However, recent work³ has suggested that the Southwest effect has started to weaken, and no longer provides the same degree of downward pressure on fares in city-pair markets in which mergers of other

¹ Wittman and Swelbar (2013) “Trends and Market Forces Shaping Small Community Air Service in the U.S.”

² cf. Morrison, S.J. 2001. Actual, adjacent, and potential competition: Estimating the full effect of Southwest Airlines. *Journal of Transport Economics and Policy* 35(2).239-256; Vowles, T.M. 2001. The “Southwest Effect” in Multi-Airport Regions. *Journal of Air Transport Management* 7(4). 251-258; Goolsbee, A. and C. Syverson. 2008. How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(4). 1611-1633; and others.

³ bin Salam, S. and B.S. McMullen. 2013. Is There Still a Southwest Effect? *Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board* 2025. 1-8.

carriers have occurred. Similarly, we find that while a Southwest effect on average fares still exists at U.S. airports, it has diminished over time. The presence of Southwest Airlines at an airport in 2007 was associated with a decrease in the airport’s average one-way fare of about \$36, controlling for average itinerary distance and other low-cost carrier competition; in 2012, that effect had decreased to \$17. Average one-way fares at Southwest have increased by about 25% over the same period, weighted by passenger itineraries and adjusting for inflation.




Figure ES-1: Effect of LCC/ULCC presence on an airport’s inflation-adjusted average one-way fare

The effects of other low-cost and ultra-low-cost carriers on average airfares at U.S. airports now exceed the Southwest effect. In 2012, the presence of JetBlue Airways, another low-cost carrier, was associated with a decrease of about \$32 in average one-way fare, controlling for average itinerary distance and other low-cost carrier competition. In the same year, Allegiant Air service was associated with an average one-way fare decrease of about \$29, and Spirit Airlines service was associated with a decrease of about \$22. However, it is important to note that these latter carriers often charge ancillary fees in addition to the base airfare, so a comparison of changes in base airfares alone does not fully capture differences in total travel price.

In summary, we find that average one-way airfares at most U.S. airports have increased from 2007-2012, adjusting for inflation. As with capacity discipline, medium-hub airports have been the hardest hit by increases in fares as airlines removed service and connectivity from those airports. With increasing prices and lower levels of connectivity than nearby larger airports, these smaller airports face considerable challenges in convincing passengers and airlines alike to select them over their larger competitors. However, if these airports can attract low-cost carriers like JetBlue Airways, average fares are likely to drop and passengers can experience an increase in both connectivity and affordability. As managers of smaller airports have realized, attracting additional service from these carriers is a top priority if these airports wish to be competitive in a U.S. airline industry landscape marked by widespread consolidation.

Introduction

Starting in 2008, the U.S. air transportation market experienced a series of supply and demand shocks. First, high and volatile fuel prices raised the operating costs of most U.S. carriers. At the same time, an economic recession took hold in the United States, reducing the demand for air travel. The effect of each of these events on airfares is unclear; since a supply shock can cause prices to rise and a demand shock can cause prices to fall, further investigation is necessary to see which effect outweighs the other when both occur simultaneously. However, we can be sure that capacity will be reduced in such a scenario; indeed, scheduled domestic flights fell by 14.3% from 2007-2012.

In 2012 and 2013, the U.S. economy started to recover. With the country no longer in recession, demand for goods and services, including air transportation, began to increase. Yet even as demand for air transportation rose, U.S. airlines kept capacity conservatively low in a strategy that has been called “capacity discipline.” That is, even though demand for air transportation is returning to its normal level, airlines have kept the supply of available seats from growing quickly. Due to these capacity restrictions, we would generally expect to see higher airfares, adjusting for inflation, in 2012 than in 2007.

This paper investigates trends in average airfares at U.S. airports from 2007-2012. We examine airfares for domestic service at various individual airports and airport types, along with trends in airfares at various airlines. Since there is a relationship between average fare and the length of a given flight, we also examine changes in average passenger itinerary distance at each of 445 U.S. airports. A detailed summary of average fares and passenger itinerary distances for these airports are given in appendices.

While an analysis of average airport fares is a relatively straightforward method for comparing changes over time in the passenger costs of air travel in the United States, it is important to understand some of the limitations to this approach. First, the average fares in this report reflect prices across a variety of markets for all types of tickets, including first-class and business-class seats. These premium seats which are sold at higher prices are not removed from the average fare calculations. Additionally, average fares for travel from an airport include hundreds of different itineraries with varying distances and other characteristics. For instance, we would expect routes with heavy business traffic to have higher average fares than routes with heavy leisure traffic due to differences in passenger mix. These nuances are somewhat obscured when examining average fares alone.

Virtually all airlines sell seats on a given flight at a variety of different prices. Average fare data does not provide information about the distribution of prices on a given flight and may mask some of these trends. Therefore, average fares shown in this report should not be used by passengers to form expectations of how much they should expect to pay for a given flight; prices vary based on seasonality, time-of-day, the number of days before the flight that the ticket is purchased, and many other factors. Finally, the average fare data given here includes only the base fare and does not include ancillary fees for baggage or other services. Many carriers have started to rely on ancillary fees as a significant portion of their operating revenues, and the impact of these fees on passenger travel costs should not be ignored. However, collected data on ancillary fees is scarce and incomplete; due to these limitations, we examine only average base fares in this report.

Data and Methodology

As with most studies of airfares in the United States, this report uses data from the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)'s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS). The BTS' DB1B ticket sample provides a 10% sample of domestic passenger itineraries that were purchased in the relevant time period.⁴ Information is provided about the marketing and operating carrier, the number of coupons (individual flight legs) in each itinerary, the origin and destination of the itinerary, whether the itinerary was non-stop or one-way, and the fare paid for the itinerary, among many other characteristics.

The BTS itself tracks airfares closely and regularly releases reports of average airfares at a variety of U.S. airports. These reports are often used in the media to rank the "most-expensive" airports in the United States. The BTS also releases information about airfares for the 1,000 most popular air travel routes in the United States in their "Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Report" publications.⁵ Fares in the Domestic Airline Fares Consumer Reports are aggregated by metro region and not by airport.

A careful reader will observe that the average fares given in this white paper do not match the BTS average airfares for the same period, even though both use BTS DB1B data as the source for their analysis. This is because this report employs a different methodology for aggregating average fares than the BTS. For instance, consider two passengers flying from BOS-SFO. Suppose that one passenger purchases a round-trip ticket for \$400, and another purchases a one-way ticket for \$200. In this case, the average (one-way) fare out of BOS should clearly be \$200, since we can divide the round-trip ticket price by two to obtain the average one-way fare.

However, the BTS calculations of average fares do not distinguish between one-way and round-trip fares. In our example, both passengers' itineraries would be treated as equal. That is, using the BTS calculation methodology, the "average fare" for the BOS-SFO route would be \$300 = $(\$200 + \$400)/2$. The BTS methodology appears to skew the actual airfares and presents an inaccurate picture of airfares at U.S. airports, particularly with the rising popularity of one-way tickets.

As such, the average airfares in this report are calculated to control for the differences in one-way and round-trip itineraries. The fare data in this report is sourced from aviation data provider Diio Mi, which also uses DB1B data. The Diio Mi data provides average **one-way net** fares, adjusting for round-trip itineraries as necessary and removing ticket taxes from the fares reported in the BTS data.

Average fares at each airport or for each airline are weighted by the number of passengers that flew each itinerary over the given time period. This data processing method results in a more representative calculation of average fares that can be better used to compare prices across airports or airlines. Passenger-weighted data on average itinerary distances have also been sourced from the BTS DB1B data via Diio Mi.

⁴ The DB1B sample contains information about all itineraries whose ticket numbers end in '0'.

⁵ These reports are available at <http://www.dot.gov/policy/aviation-policy/domestic-airline-fares-consumer-report>

Overview: Average Fares by Airport Type and by Region

Figure 1 shows the average one-way fares paid (in 2012 dollars) at each FAA airport hub type.⁶ Fares have been adjusted for inflation using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Price Index (CPI) for 2007 and 2012. Average one-way fares in constant dollars increased at each hub type from 2007-2012. Fares at the 29 large-hub airports increased by 8.7% on average during the study period, compared to an 11.9% increase at the 35 medium-hub airports and adjusting for inflation. Small-hub and non-hub airports, as well as airports that were part of the Essential Air Service (EAS) program⁷, saw lower increases in average fares over the last six years—average fares at small hubs increased by 5.7% and fares at non-hub and EAS airports rose by 3.2%, adjusting for inflation.




Figure 1: Average one-way fares by airport hub type (in 2012 dollars), adjusted for inflation

The increases in average fares at each hub type should be put in context by the changes in average passenger itinerary distance over the study period. All things equal, we would expect to see a correlation between a longer average passenger itinerary distance and a higher fare; passengers flying cross-country will often pay more than passengers flying shorter trips. Later in this report, we will show that this correlation holds when controlling for airline competition and has remained relatively unchanged over the last six years. As such, if average itinerary distances had increased significantly over the last six years at each hub type, we could attribute the increases in fares to the longer distances instead of economic supply shocks or capacity discipline.

⁶ The FAA classifies each primary commercial service airport in the United States into one of four “hub types” based on their level of enplanements in the previous year. The hub types are large-hub, medium-hub, small-hub, and non-hub. Note that in this context, “hub” refers only to the airport’s position as an important link in the air transportation network and does not reflect an airport’s status as a connecting hub for a major airline. For instance, Indianapolis International Airport (IND) is defined as a “medium-hub,” even though IND is not a connecting hub for any major airline.

⁷ The Essential Air Service program provides federal subsidies to air carriers to offer a minimum level of service to small or rural airports to connect those airports to the national air transportation system. Airports receiving EAS funding must be located at least 70 miles from the nearest large- or medium-hub airport.

Hub Type	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change in Avg. Fare (07-12)	% Change in Avg. Distance (07-12)	% Change in Flights (07-12)
Large Hub	\$164.52	\$178.76	8.7%	2.1%	-8.8%
Medium Hub	\$155.13	\$173.63	11.9%	1.5%	-26.2%
Small Hub	\$178.63	\$188.83	5.7%	0.9%	-18.2%
Non-hub/EAS	\$184.44	\$190.34	3.2%	9.8%	-13.9%

Table 1: Percent changes in average one-way fare, itinerary distance, and domestic flights, 2007-2012

Table 1 summarizes the percentage change in inflation-adjusted average fares, passenger itinerary distance, and number of scheduled domestic flights at each airport hub type over the last six years. On average, the changes in passenger itinerary distances were relatively small in comparison to the changes in fares. Therefore, it does not appear that the increases in fares over the last six years can be attributed to longer itinerary lengths alone.

Airport	City	2007 Fare (2012 \$)	2012 Fare	% Change Avg. Fare	% Change Avg. Distance	% Change Flights
HNL	Honolulu, HI	\$173.57	\$218.78	+26%	6%	-24.0%
MDW	Chicago, IL	\$113.95	\$140.00	+23%	0%	-13.6%
IAH	Houston, TX	\$185.64	\$223.17	+20%	1%	-20.3%
PHL	Philadelphia, PA	\$156.01	\$186.79	+20%	5%	-8.7%
DTW	Detroit, MI	\$154.34	\$182.07	+18%	2%	-7.8%
BOS	Boston, MA	\$179.18	\$178.89	0%	3%	-11.5%
DCA	Washington, DC	\$182.01	\$179.41	-1%	5%	+1.7%
DEN	Denver, CO	\$152.65	\$149.65	-2%	-1%	+0.6%
ATL	Atlanta, GA	\$170.80	\$165.28	-3%	0%	-6.0%
SFO	San Francisco, CA	\$207.42	\$198.50	-4%	-4%	+20.9%

Table 2: Large-hub airports with largest/smallest increase in average one-way fares, 2007-2012

Examining the data at individual airports, we begin to see some trends emerge on which airports saw large increases or decreases in fares. Table 2 shows the percentage changes in average fares, itinerary distances, and flights at 10 large-hub airports—five airports with the highest percentage increases in average fares and the five airports with the lowest percentage increases in average fares. The changes in fares, itinerary distances, and flights for all 445 U.S. airports in this study are available in several appendices at the end of the report.

For large-hub airports, there appears to be a relationship between changes in service and change in fares. Specifically, airports that gained new service from 2007-2012 were more likely to see their average fares drop over that period. DCA, DEN, and SFO are each examples of airports that both gained new service and saw average one-way fares drop over the last six years. On the other hand, HNL, MDW,

IAH, and PHL each saw increases in average fares of at least 20% from 2007-2012. These airports each lost service over the study period.

Airport	City	2007 Fare (2012 \$)	2012 Fare	% Change Avg. Fare	% Change Avg. Distance	% Change Flights
DAL	Dallas (Love), TX	\$97.28	\$133.21	37%	22%	-13.5%
HOU	Houston (Hobby), TX	\$124.89	\$157.94	26%	12%	-2.2%
OGG	Kahului, HI	\$169.90	\$214.26	26%	8%	-1.7%
CMH	Columbus, OH	\$144.01	\$174.62	21%	-2%	-21.2%
PIT	Pittsburgh, PA	\$144.84	\$173.35	20%	4%	-39.7%
OAK	Oakland, CA	\$127.54	\$134.90	6%	-12%	-36.6%
PDX	Portland, OR	\$161.70	\$170.07	5%	2%	-15.7%
CVG	Cincinnati, OH	\$224.62	\$224.01	0%	3%	-64.4%
SJU	San Juan, PR	\$185.79	\$175.65	-5%	-2%	-3.3%
MKE	Milwaukee, WI	\$165.36	\$153.53	-7%	4%	-36.9%

Table 3: Medium-hub airports with largest/smallest increase in average one-way fares, 2007-2012

However, for medium-hub airports, the links between losses in service and changes in airfares are much more tenuous. As Table 3 shows, some airports like Houston Hobby (HOU) and Kahului, HI (OGG), which had only minimal losses in flights over the last six years, each saw average one-way fares increase by 26%. Meanwhile, Cincinnati, OH (CVG), which lost 64.4% of its flights from 2007-2012—the largest loss in the country amongst all large-, medium-, and small-hubs—saw average fares remain essentially unchanged. Milwaukee, WI (MKE), which was one of only two medium-hubs to see fares decrease over the last six years, lost over a third of its domestic flights over the same period and saw its average passenger itinerary distance increase by 4%.

This suggests that other factors besides changes in average itinerary distance or number of flights help to explain the changes in fares. For instance, note that three of the airports with the largest increases in average fare—Chicago Midway International Airport in Chicago, IL (MDW), Love Field in Dallas, TX (DAL) and William P. Hobby Airport in Houston, TX (HOU)—each have a significant percentage of their flights operated by Southwest Airlines. Since changes in capacity were relatively low at these airports, a widespread pattern of price increases by Southwest Airlines could explain the increases in average fare at these airports. However, it is important to note that two of these airports saw large increases in average passenger itinerary distance as Southwest expanded the types of markets served from Houston Hobby and Love Field from 2007-2012. Nevertheless, average fares increased by 23% at Chicago Midway with a negligible change in passenger itinerary distance.

Additionally, MDW, DAL, and HOU could be each considered “secondary airports” in large metro regions that are also served by a large hub. O’Hare International Airport (ORD) in the Chicago area is one of the busiest airports in the world, Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW) is the largest airport in the Dallas metro region, and George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston (IAH) is a major hub for

United Airlines that is also classified as a large hub by the FAA. In each case, a large-hub airport in the metro region saw fares increase by a smaller percentage than the secondary airport(s) in the region.




Figure 2: Changes in fares at airports in the Boston metro region, 2007-2012

This pattern repeats itself in metro regions throughout the country. Figure 2 shows the major airports in the Boston metropolitan region. Besides Boston Logan International Airport (BOS), the Boston metro region is also served by Manchester-Boston Regional Airport (MHT) in Manchester, NH, and T.F. Green Airport (PVD) in Providence, RI. While inflation-adjusted average fares dropped by 0.2% at BOS, fares increased by 15.5% and 13.5% at MHT and PVD, respectively. Thus, as airlines consolidate service at large-hub airports in multi-airport regions, secondary airports are not only seeing fewer flights, but also larger increases in average fares. This makes it more challenging for these airports to attract passengers away from large-hub airports, since they are unable to compete on frequency or price.




Figure 3: Changes in fares at airports in the San Francisco metro region, 2007-2012

Similarly, in the San Francisco metro region, fares at the largest airport in the region, San Francisco International Airport (SFO), decreased by 4.3% from 2007-2012. At the same time, fares increased at secondary airports in Oakland (OAK) and San Jose (SJC). Note that the average fares themselves at the secondary airports in the region are still lower than the fares at SFO. This is partially due to the differences in types of airlines typically serving secondary airports versus large-hub airports (low-cost carriers versus network carriers) as well as the differences in average itinerary distance and the types of itineraries being flown at each airport. Larger airports also are more likely to enplane more business or first-class passengers purchasing more expensive itineraries, which could also explain this difference. Nevertheless, the growing convergence in fares at primary and secondary airports in multi-airport regions is a new phenomenon.

The Los Angeles metro region, which is served by no fewer than five large-hub, medium-hub, and small-hub airports, also exhibits this pattern, as shown in Figure 4. While fares at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) increased by 5.4%, the increase was less than at surrounding airports in Burbank (BUR; +9.0%), Ontario (ONT; +13.3%), and Santa Ana (SNA; +7.1%). The sole exception to this trend was Long Beach Airport (LGB), at which average fares fell by 22%. This airport saw increased service from low-cost carrier JetBlue Airways, helping to explain its competitive position relative to other airports in the Los Angeles area. As we will show later, the presence of JetBlue is one of the most important explanatory factors behind which airports have lower fares than others.




Figure 4: Changes in fares at airports in the Los Angeles metro region, 2007-2012

Table 4 summarizes the changes in fares at primary and secondary airports in various metro regions in the U.S. from 2007-2012. The table confirms that in many regions, fares increased at secondary airports by a greater percentage than primary airports in multi-airport regions over the last six years. However, average fares themselves remained lower at secondary airports, due in large part to differences in average itinerary lengths as well as the types of airlines and passengers that fly out of larger airports. For instance, the average itinerary distance at LGB was nearly half that of LAX. This regional analysis also highlights the importance that individual airline behavior can play in determining the average fare at a particular airport. The next section examines in greater detail the trends in airfares at 12 U.S. airlines over the last six years to better identify which airlines are most closely associated with lower fares.

Region	Primary Airport	Avg. Fare (2012)	% Change in Avg. Fare 07-12	Secondary Airport(s)	Avg. Fare (2012)	% Change in Avg. Fare 07-12
Boston	BOS	\$178.89	0%	MHT, PVD	\$166.99	+14%
Chicago	ORD	\$175.80	+10%	MDW	\$140.00	+23%
Houston	IAH	\$223.17	+20%	HOU	\$157.94	+26%
Dallas	DFW	\$194.65	+9%	DAL	\$133.21	+37%
San Francisco	SFO	\$198.50	-4%	OAK, SJC	\$149.64	+11%
Los Angeles	LAX	\$191.31	+5%	BUR, SNA, ONT, LGB	\$143.71	+2%
Phoenix	PHX	\$159.85	+10%	TUS	\$174.17	+9%

Table 4: Changes in fares at primary and secondary airports for selected U.S. metro regions, 2007-2012

Trends in Average Domestic Fares at Major U.S. Carriers

AIRLINE	2007 Avg. Fare*	2012 Avg. Fare	% Change in Avg. Fare	% Change in Avg. Distance*	2012 Avg. Distance*
American Airlines	\$181.93	\$199.00	9%	2%	1283 mi
DELTA	\$186.65	\$198.36	6%	-3%	1130 mi
UNITED	\$196.62	\$216.68	10%	4%	1313 mi
US AIRWAYS	\$177.93	\$197.60	11%	4%	1067 mi
AirTran	\$111.59	\$128.81	15%	6%	926 mi
FRONTIER AIRLINES	\$142.86	\$140.19	-2%	-1%	1117 mi
jetBlue	\$144.89	\$149.34	3%	-7%	1189 mi
SOUTHWEST	\$112.46	\$140.87	25%	12%	887 mi
Alaska Airlines	\$156.60	\$180.63	15%	29%	1250 mi
HAWAIIAN AIRLINES	\$138.59	\$155.59	12%	-7%	1207 mi
allegiant	\$97.21	\$86.89	-11%	1%	944 mi
spirit airlines	\$105.40	\$71.06	-33%	-10%	959 mi

*one-way, adjusted for inflation using CPI *average passenger itinerary distance *average passenger itinerary distance

Table 5: Average domestic fares and passenger itinerary distances for 12 major U.S. airlines, 2007-12

Table 5 shows the changes in average one-way fares⁸ and average passenger itinerary distances for 12 U.S. air carriers from 2007-2012. The airlines in Table 5 are grouped by category: the first four airlines (American, Delta, United, and US Airways) are generally classified as “network carriers;” the second four airlines (AirTran, Frontier, JetBlue, and Southwest) are typically referred to as “low-cost carriers;” Alaska and Hawaiian are both “specialty” carriers with unique network structures clustered around specific regions; and Allegiant and Spirit are two of a new breed of “ultra-low-cost carriers” that have primarily focused on serving tertiary airports and airports in small communities, offering customers in these communities flights to vacation destinations with very low base fares. We will examine the trends in airfares in each of these groups of carriers separately.

Average network carrier fares have increased as available capacity and itinerary lengths change

Due in part to changes in capacity and average passenger itinerary distances, average one-way fares at network carriers rose between 6-11% from 2007-2012. Many of the network carriers struggled financially at times from 2007-2012, with several declaring bankruptcy over the study period. Delta and

⁸ Average fares shown include domestic itineraries only, have been adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index, and are shown in 2012 dollars.

United both completed mergers with other iconic network carriers; American and US Airways proposed to merge in 2013.

These carriers emerged from this tumultuous period of bankruptcy and mergers with leaner operations and reduced frequencies across their networks. The network carriers have continued to keep capacity low over the last several years as they practice a disciplined capacity management strategy that emphasizes flying profitable routes over gaining market share. As capacity is reduced, increases in average fares have less of an adverse effect on load factors. This strategy has led the network carriers to post their first consistent profits in nearly a decade. For these reasons, the increases in average fares seen at the network carriers from 2007-2012 can largely be attributed to the effects of capacity discipline strategies and to the differences in these carriers' networks following a round of mergers.

Low-cost carriers aren't quite as low-cost for passengers any more

The types of domestic flights flown by network carriers—a mix of short-haul regional service and long-haul transcontinental options—differ from the service provided by low-cost carriers—a significant portion of which involves travel to leisure destinations. Hence, it is not surprising that the average fares of low-cost carriers have remained at least 25% lower than network carriers. Yet despite this, several of the low-cost carriers saw dramatic increases in their average one-way fares over the last six years. Average fares increased at AirTran Airways, which was acquired by Southwest Airlines in 2011, by about 15% from 2007-2012. Southwest Airlines itself saw an increase in average fares of 25% over the same period. Meanwhile, average fares at JetBlue Airways increased by just 3% over the last six years.

There are several possible explanations for Southwest Airlines' significant increase in average fares. Southwest itself practiced some capacity discipline over the last six years, particularly in smaller and mid-sized airports. Southwest cut scheduled domestic flights by 10% at smaller airports in the U.S. from 2007-2012; if there is indeed a link between cuts in service and increases in fares (as economic theory would predict), this could explain why some smaller airports dominated by Southwest Airlines, such as Dallas Love Field (DAL) and Houston Hobby (HOU), saw large increases in average fares coupled with deep cuts in service over the study period.

The last six years have also seen dramatic changes in Southwest's well-established network strategy. In the 1990s and early-2000s, Southwest found a niche in operating point-to-point flights from secondary airports in multi-airport regions, often at lower fares than could be found at primary airports in those regions. However, over the last six years, Southwest has started to move into those same larger airports that it had previously forsaken. Southwest has moved into Boston Logan (BOS), New York-LaGuardia (LGA), and Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR) over the last six years, and it now serves 23 of the 29 largest airports in the United States. Its merger with AirTran Airways will give the combined airline a larger presence at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport (ATL)—the busiest airport in the United States by passenger enplanements.

Moving into larger airports could have increased Southwest's costs. Larger airports are more likely to be congested, leading to more costs in delays and cancellations. On the other hand, larger airports are

more likely to attract business passengers, who often have a higher willingness-to-pay for airline tickets. Either or both of these factors could have given Southwest leverage to raise average fares. Southwest's operating costs may have also increased for other reasons. The advantages from the airline's famous fuel hedge have evaporated with constantly high fuel prices, and the seniority levels of the airline's employees have started to increase, requiring higher pay and retirement benefits. These increases in operating costs could have also led to Southwest's increase in average fares.

Finally, it is worth noting that Southwest, unlike its network carrier competition, does not rely on checked baggage fees as a source of ancillary revenue. It is possible that Southwest could have raised its base fares to make up for the lost revenue potential of offering free checked baggage. However, JetBlue Airways, which also does not charge fees for checked baggage, had only a modest increase in its average fares in the last six years.

Whatever the reason for Southwest's increase in average fare, low-cost carriers are starting to behave more like traditional network carriers. As their brands and their workforces both become more mature, the LCCs have entered into larger markets at slightly higher average fares. While the low-cost carriers are not quite as low-cost for passengers any more, we do not expect to see a complete convergence in fares at network carriers and low-cost carriers. LCCs still offer lower fares to passengers in many markets, and we expect that these carriers will continue to maintain unique networks with a heavy focus on leisure travel in the next decade—this alone will continue to keep the average fares at these carriers lower than at the network carriers.

Specialty carriers are adjusting fares as their networks change

Airline analysts often have difficulty classifying Alaska Airlines and Hawaiian Airlines. Both airlines serve a targeted area of the United States that remains relatively unserved by other carriers. Traditionally, Alaska and Hawaiian generally provided a mix of short-haul service linking together small communities and long-haul service connecting the rest of the United States to hubs in Seattle and Honolulu.

However, these airlines—Alaska in particular—have started to change their networks over the last six years. Alaska's average itinerary distance increased by 29% from 2007-2012, reflecting a new commitment to longer-haul service. The airline has bolstered its presence at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA) while also building new cross-country service. As a result of these longer itinerary distances and stage lengths, Alaska's average one-way fares have increased by 15%. Hawaiian's fares have risen by 12% over the study period, but its average itinerary distance has fallen by 7% as it has cut unprofitable long-haul service to focus more on inter-island and international service. We should expect to see further adjustments in fares from these carriers as their networks continue to change over the next decade.

A new breed of ultra-low-cost carriers is picking up where the traditional LCCs left off

The latter half of the 2000s saw the emergence of a new breed of low-cost airlines with a very different business model than that of the "traditional" low-cost carriers. These carriers, such as Allegiant Air, Spirit Airlines, Sun Country Airlines, and others, focused on providing infrequent service to tertiary

airports in multi-airport regions, or to airports at which there was no currently existing commercial air service. At these airports, the “ultra-low-cost” carriers stepped in to provide service to vacation destinations at heavily discounted base fares, often packaging a flight with a hotel, rental car, or vacation package. Flights to the smallest airports in these airlines’ networks may only be operated a few times per week.

Allegiant Air and Spirit Airlines have been two of the most successful ultra-low-cost carriers. Targeting an exclusively leisure audience, we would expect that their average fares to be lower than network carriers or even the existing low-cost carriers, which do serve some business routes. Indeed, average fares at LCCs were nearly twice as high as ULCC fares in 2012; average network carrier fares were nearly three times as high as ULCC fares in the same year. Additionally, while network carriers, LCCs, and specialty carriers alike were all increasing average fares from 2007-2012, fares at ULCCs decreased over the study period by as much as 33%.

While the decreases in base fares at the ULCCs are impressive, it is important to note that these fare decreases occurred at the same time as these carriers started to rely more on ancillary revenues as a significant portion of the full travel price. That is, while the base fare of a ULCC ticket is often very low, passengers may need to pay additional fees to check-in, check bags, access customer service personnel, or even carry-on a bag on some airlines. Hence, looking only at the base fare may present a skewed picture of the total passenger cost on ULCCs if ancillary fees are not taken into account.

Data on ancillary revenues is currently collected and defined inconsistently and not tied to individual itineraries. That is, we currently do not know how much an average Spirit Airlines passenger pays in ancillary services. Adding ancillary fees to average fares would assist in making apples-to-apples comparisons in total passenger itinerary cost between the ULCCs and other airlines. Absent that data, however, we are only able to make comparisons of base fares alone.

The ultra-low-cost carriers have unabashedly targeted extremely price sensitive passengers. Spirit Airlines CEO Ben Baldanza has suggested that these customers are likely to choose his airline repeatedly if it offers the lowest base fare, even if passengers have to pay substantially more in additional ancillary fees.⁹ The business model of Spirit is still relatively new and its sustainability remains to be seen, but both Spirit and Allegiant Air have experienced robust financial success, even in challenging periods for airline profitability. However, these airlines’ pricing strategies and competitive advantages could be eroded if consumer advocates succeed in passing legislation to require airlines to display full costs of travel—base fares and ancillary fees combined—on popular distribution systems and travel booking websites.

⁹ Maxon, T. 2013. “Spirit Airlines CEO: We have the lowest prices, and that’s what customers care about.” Dallas Morning News. May 22 2013.

Determinants of Average Fares at U.S. Airports—the Effects of LCCs

Since the rise of the low-cost and low-fare carriers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, researchers have been interested in identifying the effects of these carriers on average airfares. Most early work focused on the largest and most popular low-cost carrier: Southwest Airlines. Specifically, researchers were interested in investigating whether the presence of low-cost carriers like Southwest Airlines has a dampening effect on the fares on a given route.

Past research on the “Southwest effect” has shown that either direct competition (competition on the same route) or adjacent competition (competition in a city-pair market between alternative airports in a multi-airport region) by Southwest Airlines tends to be associated with an increase in traffic on that route and a decrease in average fare. That is, once Southwest Airlines enters a market directly or adjacently, existing network carriers typically lower their fares to match Southwest’s lower prices.¹⁰

However, with Southwest Airlines’ average fares increasing by 25% from 2007 to 2012, it is unclear whether Southwest still holds the same degree of price leadership as it once did. Recent work by bin Salam and McMullen¹¹ found that the Southwest effect had weakened between 2005 and 2010 in markets in which mergers had occurred between network carriers, such as United-Continental or Delta-Northwest. That is, the presence of Southwest Airlines on merger-affected routes did less to lower average fares than previous research would have suggested. Since the competitive effects of Southwest on network carrier airfares are often used by merger advocates as an argument in antitrust reviews, bin Salam and McMullen question whether Southwest can still be relied upon as a protection against monopolistic competition on air travel routes.

Meanwhile, the effects of other low-cost carriers like JetBlue Airways and the impacts of ultra-low-cost carriers like Allegiant Air and Spirit Airlines on airfares have not been explored individually in detail. While these airlines have smaller route networks than Southwest Airlines, they are important players in the U.S. air transportation system, particularly at smaller airports. This section investigates whether the presence of these low-cost carriers at U.S. airports reduces average fares at those airports, and how those effects have changed over time. We will also explore the effects of capacity discipline on average airfares, and examine if there is a statistically significant link between changes in capacity and changes in fares.

¹⁰ Studies investigating the Southwest effect include: Morrison, S.J. 2001. Actual, adjacent, and potential competition: Estimating the full effect of Southwest Airlines. Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 35(2).23-256; Vowles, T.M. 2001. The “Southwest Effect” in Multi-Airport Regions. Journal of Air Transport Management 7(4). 251-258; Goolsbee, A. and C. Syverson. 2008. How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines. Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(4). 1611-1633; Hofer, C., R.J. Windle, and M.E. Dresner. 2008. Price premiums and low-cost carrier competition. Transportation Research Part E 44(5). 864-882; and Brueckner, J.K., D. Lee, and E.S. Singer. 2012. Airfare competition and domestic US airfares: A comprehensive reappraisal. Economics of Transportation 2(1). 1-17.

¹¹ bin Salam, S. and B.S. McMullen. 2013. Is There Still a Southwest Effect? Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 2025. 1-8.

Econometric model

Following the research approaches of previous work, we will use a simple econometric model to identify the effects of LCC competition on average one-way airfares at U.S. airports. In this case, the econometric model is a linear equation that allows us to isolate the effects of one or more independent variables (e.g., LCC competition and other airport characteristics) on a dependent variable (in this case, the average airfare at an airport). Using statistical techniques, we can test whether the coefficients of this linear equation are significantly different from zero (or not) at a given level of confidence. If an independent variable’s coefficient is significantly different from zero, we can conclude that there is a relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable. Otherwise, no such conclusion can be drawn.

The linear equation used in our econometric model of average airport airfares is shown below. Table 6 describes in detail each of the variables in the equation.

$$FARE = \beta_0 + \beta_1DIST + \beta_2WN + \beta_3B6 + \beta_4FL + \beta_5F9 + \beta_6G4 + \beta_7NK + \beta_8VACATION + \varepsilon$$

Equation 1: Econometric model of average airport airfare

Variable	Description
FARE	Avg. fare at the airport
DIST	Avg. itinerary distance
WN	Presence of Southwest
B6	Presence of JetBlue
FL	Presence of AirTran
F9	Presence of Frontier
G4	Presence of Allegiant
NK	Presence of Spirit
VACATION	Vacation destination (airports in FL and NV)

Table 6: Description of variables in Equation 1

As Table 6 describes, we are postulating that the average one-way fare at an airport will be a function of the average itinerary distance at the airport; the number of airlines competing at the airport; the presence of low-cost like Southwest, JetBlue, AirTran, and Frontier; the presence of ultra-low-cost carriers like Allegiant and Spirit; and whether the airport is a vacation destination or not (here, following Hofer et al. (2008), airports in Florida and Nevada are designated as vacation destinations for simplicity). Passenger enplanements are not included in the regression equation since there is a possibility that the number of passengers using an airport could itself be a function of airfares. Equation 1 also contains an error term ε , which is a common econometric practice to capture effects that are not directly specified by the model.

Data on average fares, itinerary distances, and airlines providing service were gathered from Diio Mi for 445 U.S. airports for the years 2007 and 2012. We estimated the coefficients of Equation 1 for each of these years, allowing us to see how the effects of Southwest or other low-cost or ultra-low-cost carriers have changed over time. Table 7 shows the results of the econometric model for these years.

Variable	(1) 2007 Fares	(2) 2012 Fares
Constant	92.72*** (4.488)	94.58*** (5.203)
Avg. Itinerary Distance	0.122*** (0.005)	0.122*** (0.006)
Southwest	-35.78*** (7.105)	-16.65** (6.692)
JetBlue	-29.84*** (7.514)	-32.20*** (7.595)
AirTran	-15.51** (7.033)	2.04 (7.353)
Frontier	-2.53 (7.517)	7.14 (6.522)
Allegiant	-20.47*** (5.374)	-28.52*** (5.364)
Spirit	-27.48*** (9.726)	-22.10** (9.384)
Vacation Destination	-3.81 (9.122)	-22.57** (9.810)
N	445	445
Adjusted R ²	0.5800	0.5267

Coefficients are presented with standard errors in parentheses

* = 90% significance, ** = 95% significance, *** = 99% significance

Table 7: Regression Results – Fares on Distance and Competition

The top number of each row in Table 7 is the coefficient for that variable in Equation 1 as estimated using a standard ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression technique. The number in parenthesis beneath each estimated coefficient is the standard error for that coefficient's estimate. The significance of each coefficient (how sure we are that the coefficient is statistically different from zero) is shown using asterisks. A single asterisk indicates that we can be 90% confident that the coefficient is different from zero, two asterisks indicates a confidence level of 95%, and three asterisks indicates a confidence level of 99%. Finally, the adjusted R² value is a measure (ranging from 0-1) of how well the variables we selected explain the variations in average fares between airports.

Discussion of regression results: Should we be more focused on the JetBlue effect?

As expected, the average itinerary distance at an airport has a positive and significant relationship with average airfares; airports from which passengers fly longer distances have generally higher fares. This

relationship has remained essentially unchanged over time. It is also interesting to note that while the number of airlines that provide service at a given airport did not have a significant relationship with airfares in 2012, the presence of specific competitors is associated with lower average airfares. The presence of an LCC like Southwest, JetBlue, Allegiant, or Spirit is associated with a decrease in average one-way fare of between \$15-\$36, depending on the airline and the year and controlling for distance and other airport characteristics.¹² However, the presence of AirTran and Frontier no longer have a significant effect on average one-way fares once other LCC competition is taken into account.

In 2007, the Southwest effect was highly significant. The presence of Southwest Airlines at an airport in 2007 was associated with a decrease that airport's average fare of about \$36, controlling for average itinerary distance and other competition. However, by 2012, that effect had declined to about \$17. That is, the presence of Southwest Airlines no longer is associated with as much of a reduction in average airport fares as has been previously shown by other researchers. Indeed, the presence of some other low-cost carriers now outpaces the Southwest effect. In 2012, the presence of JetBlue Airways reduced average one-way airport fares by about \$32, Allegiant Air service reduced average one-way airport fares by about \$29, and the presence of Spirit reduced average one-way fares by about \$22.

JetBlue is now the airline whose presence is associated with the largest decrease in average fares. As such, we would not be surprised to see airports, particularly small community airports or secondary airports in large multi-airport regions, work particularly hard to attract JetBlue service. Gaining service from an airline like JetBlue not only attracts customers through a decrease in average fare, but also through an increase in connectivity and the number of destinations that can be reached through both non-stop and connecting service. As Southwest begins to focus its expansion efforts internationally instead of domestically, we would expect the "JetBlue effect" to become part of the business development and academic lexicon surrounding low-cost carriers.

On the other hand, the recently diminished nature of the Southwest effect is not surprising given the scale of Southwest's fare increases over the last six years. It should be noted, however, that Southwest Airlines does not charge fees for checked baggage, as opposed to many of its competitors who charge upwards of \$25 for a checked bag.¹³ It is possible that Southwest decided to raise base fares in lieu of charging bag fees in an attempt to separate themselves from competing airlines.

On the other end of the spectrum, Allegiant Air and Spirit Airlines have chosen strategies of offering the lowest possible base fare and gaining a large portion of revenue through ancillary sources. While passengers often see only the base fares when selecting which ticket to purchase, the ULCCs are offering a fundamentally different service coupled with their base fare as opposed to the "full-service" LCCs like Southwest and JetBlue, which offer free checked baggage, on-board amenities, and other features.

¹² We also tested if an airport's designation as a hub for a network carrier and/or an LCC had an effect on average one-way airfares at that airport; this variable was found to be insignificant in all years and was removed from the model.

¹³ As of July 2013, Southwest Airlines offered two free checked bags, JetBlue Airways offered one free checked bag, and Allegiant Air and Spirit Airlines both charged for checked baggage.

Therefore, it may not be appropriate to directly compare the “Southwest effect” with the “Spirit effect,” given that these two airlines are offering different packages of products and services as part of their base fares.

Capacity discipline and changes in airfares

Economic theory suggests that restrictions in supply will result in higher prices. Capacity discipline strategies on the part of the airlines have restricted the number of available flights and seats in most markets. However, is there a direct correlation between capacity discipline and higher airfares? In other words, is there a negative correlation between percent changes in flights and seats and percent changes in fares? We can test the answer to this question by performing a Pearson’s correlation test on percent changes in flights, seats, and airfares (from 2007-2012) for the 445 airports in our sample.

Variable	Correlation	p-value	R ²
% change in flights	-0.1988	<0.001	0.0373
% change in seats	-0.1488	<0.001	0.0199

Table 8: Correlation coefficients: % change in fares and % change in capacity, 2007-2012

Table 8 shows the Pearson’s correlation coefficients for percent changes in fares and percent changes in capacity at 445 U.S. airports from 2007-2012. The correlation coefficient ranges between -1 and 1; a value of -1 suggests that the variables are perfectly negatively correlated; a value of 1 suggests that the variables are perfectly positively correlated; and a value of 0 suggests the variables are uncorrelated. The p-value tells us how certain we can be that the given correlation coefficient is statistically different from 0—in this case, we can be 99.9% sure that the coefficients are different from zero. Finally, as before, the R² value tells us how well the percent change in capacity explains the variations in percent changes in fares.

As expected, there is a negative correlation between percent changes in capacity and percent changes in fares. This means that as capacity increases, fares generally fall; conversely, decreases in capacity are associated with increases in fares. This suggests that the theoretical relationship between capacity discipline and fare increases does indeed exist in practice. However, it should be noted that the explanatory power of capacity discipline alone is very low—the R² values are very low, and the correlation coefficients themselves are fairly close to zero. Thus, other factors, such as the presence of low-cost carriers or changes in the average passenger itinerary distance at an airport, do a better job of explaining changes in fares than capacity discipline alone.

Conclusion: Future Changes in Airfares in an Environment of Capacity Discipline

There is no evidence that the current airline strategy of capacity discipline will be reversed in the near future. Airlines are experiencing profitability for the first time in years, and the equilibrium in which each of the largest airlines continues to keep capacity low (compared to historical levels and growth in GDP) seems to be stable in the short run. In the long run, an airline could deviate from the capacity discipline equilibrium in an attempt to gain market share—this theoretical increase of capacity would likely be associated with lower fares, particularly if other airlines match this strategy. Meanwhile, we should expect JetBlue Airways and the ultra-low-cost carriers to continue their pattern of steady growth.

If the levels of available domestic capacity follow the trends described above, we would expect average one-way domestic airfares to remain flat or increase slightly over the next five years, assuming that there is no shock to the price of fuel or another local or global economic downturn. In this scenario, major airlines would keep capacity at current levels (without cutting it further), and base fares would remain level as airlines continue their shift to ancillary revenues to bolster earnings. The growth of JetBlue and the other ULCCs could result in even lower average fares at airports served by these airlines.

Should it be approved, the merger of American Airlines and US Airways will bring about further consolidation of the U.S. air transportation industry and could result in some capacity being removed from the system. As economic theory and our analysis suggests, a reduction in available capacity could result in higher fares in some markets. Our work and the work of others suggest that it is unclear whether low-cost carrier competition will temper the upward pressures of capacity discipline and mergers on prices; the Southwest effect has diminished in past years, although the effects of carriers like JetBlue, Allegiant, and Spirit on average one-way fares at U.S. airports remain strong.

At smaller airports and secondary airports in multi-airport regions, increases or decreases in average airfares will likely continue to outpace the changes at larger airports. These airports will face increasing pressure to obtain service from low-cost or ultra-low-cost carriers—as network carriers continue to exit smaller airports, those airports that have not implemented a contingency plan to replace this service with LCC or ULCC flights could see average fares rise as daily departures fall. This is a challenging combination for a smaller airport, as passengers will often choose to fly out of a nearby larger airport to take advantage of lower fares and more flight options, even if this means a significant drive from the passenger's origin point. We have already started to see this pattern take hold in some metro areas at which average fares increased substantially more at secondary airports than at primary airports.

Finally, the total system impact of this continued consolidation of flights and connectivity at large hubs, coupled with a growing convergence in fares between primary and secondary airports, will be important to monitor. Risks of congestion and flight delays increase as passengers and departures cluster at larger airports. If current trends of consolidation continue and result in future growth in traffic at large-hub airports, improved air traffic management approaches may be necessary to avoid costly periods of increased delays in the National Airspace System.

Appendix A: Summary of Changes in Fares for Large-Hub Airports

Notes: Tables show enplaned passengers (2012 data) from the FAA, as well as passenger-weighted one-way average domestic fares and average itinerary distances (in miles) for each airport for 2007 and 2012. All fare, itinerary distance, and capacity data was sourced from Diio Mii. 2007 fares have been adjusted for inflation and are displayed in constant 2012 dollars. Airports are ranked in order of highest change in average one-way fare to lowest change in average one-way fare. All hub definitions are current as of June, 2013.

Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
HNL - Honolulu/Oahu, HI	9,210,270	\$173.57	\$218.78	26%	1845	1956	6%	-24%	-20%
MDW - Chicago-Midway, IL	9,431,796	\$113.95	\$140.00	23%	897	896	0%	-14%	-10%
IAH - Houston-Intercontinental, TX	19,038,958	\$185.64	\$223.17	20%	1091	1102	1%	-20%	-15%
PHL - Philadelphia, PA	14,587,631	\$156.01	\$186.79	20%	1121	1173	5%	-9%	-15%
DTW - Detroit, MI	15,599,877	\$154.34	\$182.07	18%	986	1008	2%	-8%	-16%
BWI - Baltimore, MD	11,183,965	\$133.59	\$155.00	16%	996	975	-2%	-3%	-3%
IAD - Washington-Dulles, VA	10,785,683	\$190.02	\$220.24	16%	1295	1455	12%	-20%	-20%
TPA - Tampa, FL	8,216,153	\$134.20	\$153.42	14%	1040	1047	1%	-24%	-18%
EWK - Newark, NJ	17,035,098	\$188.71	\$208.77	11%	1337	1345	1%	-9%	-11%
ORD - Chicago-O'Hare, IL	32,171,743	\$159.33	\$175.80	10%	977	991	1%	-7%	-16%
SLC - Salt Lake City, UT	9,579,836	\$166.56	\$183.31	10%	1037	1042	1%	-23%	-16%
PHX - Phoenix, AZ	19,556,189	\$145.62	\$159.85	10%	1135	1165	3%	-14%	-14%
DFW - Dallas/Fort Worth, TX	28,022,877	\$177.85	\$194.65	9%	1020	1030	1%	-6%	-5%
SAN - San Diego, CA	8,686,592	\$157.42	\$171.33	9%	1273	1311	3%	-20%	-12%
MCO - Orlando, FL	17,159,425	\$135.06	\$145.63	8%	1069	1083	1%	-19%	-13%
MSP - Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN	15,943,751	\$182.70	\$196.98	8%	1043	1021	-2%	-7%	-12%
CLT - Charlotte-Douglas, NC	20,032,426	\$174.35	\$187.19	7%	864	836	-3%	10%	13%
MIA - Miami, FL	18,987,488	\$169.91	\$180.64	6%	1212	1233	2%	1%	6%
JFK - New York-JFK, NY	24,520,943	\$184.76	\$196.27	6%	1525	1640	8%	-19%	-11%
LAS - Las Vegas, NV	19,941,173	\$140.80	\$149.44	6%	1208	1200	-1%	-19%	-17%
LAX - Los Angeles, CA	31,326,268	\$181.53	\$191.31	5%	1513	1568	4%	-7%	-2%
SEA - Seattle/Tacoma, WA	16,121,123	\$176.05	\$184.20	5%	1406	1425	1%	-11%	-6%
FLL - Fort Lauderdale, FL	11,445,101	\$136.91	\$141.98	4%	1144	1184	3%	-8%	-4%
LGA - New York-La Guardia, NY	12,818,717	\$159.98	\$165.53	3%	909	944	4%	-9%	-2%
BOS - Boston, MA	14,293,675	\$179.18	\$178.89	0%	1227	1264	3%	-12%	-4%
DCA - Washington-National, DC	9,462,206	\$182.01	\$179.41	-1%	895	938	5%	2%	-1%
DEN - Denver, CO	25,799,832	\$152.65	\$149.65	-2%	1031	1021	-1%	1%	3%
ATL - Atlanta, GA	45,798,809	\$170.80	\$165.28	-3%	867	870	0%	-6%	-1%
SFO - San Francisco, CA	21,284,224	\$207.42	\$198.50	-4%	1665	1604	-4%	21%	22%
Grand Total (Large-Hubs)	518,041,829	\$164.52	\$178.76	8.7%	1559.5	1183.6	-2.1%	-8.8%	-7.2%

Appendix B: Summary of Changes in Fares for Medium-Hub Airports

Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
DAL - Dallas-Love, TX	3,902,521	\$97.28	\$133.21	37%	478	583	22%	-14%	-7%
HOU - Houston-Hobby, TX	5,043,708	\$124.89	\$157.94	26%	730	821	12%	-2%	-1%
OGG - Kahului/Maui, HI	2,861,278	\$169.90	\$214.26	26%	1677	1819	8%	-2%	-12%
CMH - Columbus, OH	3,095,360	\$144.01	\$174.62	21%	915	898	-2%	-21%	-18%
PIT - Pittsburgh, PA	3,889,997	\$144.84	\$173.35	20%	906	943	4%	-40%	-28%
CLE - Cleveland, OH	4,325,353	\$165.64	\$195.29	18%	945	938	-1%	-26%	-24%
BNA - Nashville, TN	4,796,868	\$145.67	\$171.66	18%	862	841	-2%	-8%	-10%
IND - Indianapolis, IN	3,585,246	\$155.97	\$183.71	18%	957	950	-1%	-21%	-18%
JAX - Jacksonville, FL	2,579,021	\$148.53	\$174.55	18%	932	947	2%	-26%	-22%
RNO - Reno, NV	1,685,333	\$138.91	\$162.37	17%	974	984	1%	-31%	-35%
BUF - Buffalo, NY	2,588,660	\$131.84	\$153.44	16%	920	947	3%	-9%	-5%
SMF - Sacramento, CA	4,357,899	\$140.23	\$163.19	16%	1034	1101	6%	-24%	-24%
RSW - Fort Myers, FL	3,630,737	\$139.29	\$161.52	16%	1130	1139	1%	-15%	-13%
SJC - San Jose, CA	4,077,644	\$142.39	\$164.38	15%	1029	1084	5%	-33%	-28%
MCI - Kansas City, MO	4,866,850	\$143.44	\$162.97	14%	884	894	1%	-30%	-25%
PVD - Providence, RI	1,808,317	\$147.60	\$167.58	14%	1111	1117	0%	-38%	-36%
ONT - Ontario, CA	2,142,387	\$141.25	\$160.09	13%	1007	1020	1%	-49%	-43%
PBI - West Palm Beach, FL	2,796,324	\$143.50	\$162.38	13%	1092	1079	-1%	-25%	-21%
MEM - Memphis, TN	3,359,622	\$198.39	\$223.17	12%	797	834	5%	-41%	-42%
MSY - New Orleans, LA	4,293,538	\$160.10	\$179.83	12%	908	937	3%	4%	9%
OMA - Omaha, NE	2,018,526	\$157.93	\$175.84	11%	944	932	-1%	-19%	-14%
RDU - Raleigh/Durham, NC	4,489,097	\$147.92	\$163.68	11%	885	867	-2%	-23%	-16%
BUR - Burbank, CA	2,027,197	\$123.92	\$135.08	9%	767	716	-7%	-25%	-28%
ANC - Anchorage, AK	2,249,475	\$238.61	\$259.62	9%	1864	1733	-7%	-12%	-13%
BDL - Hartford, CT	2,647,064	\$176.59	\$191.00	8%	1228	1217	-1%	-24%	-24%
AUS - Austin, TX	4,606,143	\$164.65	\$178.07	8%	1005	1085	8%	-11%	-3%
SAT - San Antonio, TX	4,036,598	\$166.58	\$179.34	8%	983	1037	6%	-14%	-10%
SNA - Orange County, CA	4,381,956	\$156.09	\$167.17	7%	1071	1105	3%	-24%	-20%
ABQ - Albuquerque, NM	2,630,570	\$153.98	\$164.88	7%	950	968	2%	-26%	-26%
STL - St. Louis, MO	6,200,252	\$154.62	\$164.57	6%	855	879	3%	-27%	-20%
OAK - Oakland, CA	4,923,435	\$127.54	\$134.90	6%	1011	894	-12%	-37%	-36%
PDX - Portland, OR	7,142,610	\$161.70	\$170.07	5%	1251	1278	2%	-16%	-9%
CVG - Cincinnati, OH/Northern KY	2,927,218	\$224.62	\$224.01	0%	859	886	3%	-64%	-62%
SIU - San Juan, PR	4,204,478	\$185.79	\$175.65	-5%	1627	1599	-2%	-3%	-20%
MKE - Milwaukee, WI	3,707,890	\$165.36	\$153.53	-7%	972	1011	4%	-37%	-8%
Grand Total (Medium-Hubs)	127,879,172	\$155.13	\$173.63	11.9%	1016.1	1030.9	1.5%	-26.2%	-21.4%

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Appendix C: Summary of Changes in Fares for Small-Hub Airports

Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
ITO - Hilo/Hawaii, HI	641,904	\$68.42	\$111.70	63%	527	582	10%	-37%	-25%
LIH - Lihue/Kauai, HI	1,308,549	\$149.14	\$210.97	41%	1348	1715	27%	-13%	-15%
PHF - Newport News, VA	314,139	\$140.14	\$187.80	34%	743	1095	47%	-30%	-46%
MAF - Midland/Odessa, TX	497,193	\$135.53	\$180.10	33%	624	658	6%	-5%	-12%
KOA - Kona/Hawaii, HI	1,367,091	\$156.51	\$205.84	32%	1390	1620	17%	-8%	-19%
LBB - Lubbock, TX	475,680	\$128.67	\$169.09	31%	605	659	9%	-17%	-24%
AMA - Amarillo, TX	389,284	\$138.21	\$175.04	27%	651	680	4%	-19%	-18%
ISP - Long Island-MacArthur, NY	667,573	\$112.12	\$141.22	26%	1080	966	-10%	-46%	-47%
GPT - Gulfport/Biloxi, MS	394,056	\$176.82	\$220.42	25%	883	985	12%	-25%	-30%
TUL - Tulsa, OK	1,324,175	\$158.87	\$196.07	23%	822	815	-1%	-26%	-20%
BOI - Boise, ID	1,307,505	\$144.18	\$175.59	22%	843	919	9%	-40%	-34%
FNT - Flint, MI	409,401	\$136.95	\$166.47	22%	953	958	1%	-34%	-29%
MLI - Moline, IL	396,460	\$160.46	\$194.71	21%	956	964	1%	-19%	-21%
SAV - Savannah, GA	789,256	\$173.47	\$207.51	20%	903	979	8%	-19%	-23%
SDF - Louisville, KY	1,642,697	\$157.80	\$185.78	18%	832	845	2%	-23%	-18%
ELP - El Paso, TX	1,442,100	\$163.69	\$191.85	17%	918	966	5%	-11%	-18%
ALB - Albany, NY	1,220,286	\$166.12	\$194.50	17%	1173	1192	2%	-18%	-19%
GEG - Spokane, WA	1,456,275	\$143.71	\$166.80	16%	938	990	6%	-26%	-20%
SRQ - Sarasota/Bradenton, FL	637,260	\$143.48	\$166.32	16%	1023	1051	3%	-38%	-24%
MHT - Manchester, NH	1,209,987	\$144.09	\$166.39	15%	1102	1137	3%	-41%	-45%
JAN - Jackson, MS	611,592	\$176.99	\$203.25	15%	850	820	-4%	-20%	-22%
OKC - Oklahoma City, OK	1,801,613	\$169.70	\$193.91	14%	892	887	-1%	-15%	-4%
RIC - Richmond, VA	1,581,617	\$170.30	\$192.31	13%	910	961	6%	-20%	-17%
HPN - Westchester County, NY	893,064	\$156.06	\$174.17	12%	979	1008	3%	-12%	-11%
LIT - Little Rock, AR	1,111,381	\$164.35	\$183.41	12%	817	848	4%	-20%	-12%
CAK - Akron/Canton, OH	910,313	\$138.19	\$154.00	11%	897	942	5%	-4%	16%
BTU - Burlington, VT	615,005	\$178.90	\$198.84	11%	1181	1091	-8%	-24%	-18%
BHM - Birmingham, AL	1,412,481	\$163.52	\$181.49	11%	845	814	-4%	-18%	-15%
SYR - Syracuse, NY	968,644	\$177.40	\$196.11	11%	1082	1071	-1%	-22%	-21%
TUS - Tucson, AZ	1,710,638	\$159.49	\$174.17	9%	1116	1127	1%	-26%	-23%
ROC - Rochester, NY	1,199,194	\$152.26	\$165.49	9%	942	943	0%	-21%	-20%
PNS - Pensacola, FL	740,852	\$179.92	\$195.33	9%	909	934	3%	-16%	-14%
FAI - Fairbanks, AK	450,436	\$245.15	\$265.91	8%	1481	1300	-12%	-2%	-6%
ORF - Norfolk, VA	1,649,123	\$176.72	\$189.53	7%	1093	1059	-3%	-19%	-13%
XNA - Northwest Arkansas, AR	546,845	\$237.51	\$253.13	7%	896	887	-1%	-14%	-15%
MSN - Madison, WI	798,789	\$195.56	\$208.24	6%	992	998	1%	-21%	-15%
DAY - Dayton, OH	1,288,541	\$161.53	\$171.22	6%	924	929	6%	-21%	-13%
ABE - Allentown, PA	348,905	\$176.93	\$186.42	5%	1003	1005	0%	-25%	-18%

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Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
ILM - Wilmington, NC	391,969	\$178.02	\$186.51	5%	886	911	3%	3%	-2%
GRR - Grand Rapids, MI	1,063,151	\$190.77	\$198.97	4%	1024	1052	3%	-9%	3%
CID - Cedar Rapids, IA	491,651	\$197.41	\$205.31	4%	996	1026	3%	-17%	-16%
PWM - Portland, ME	794,468	\$182.77	\$189.74	4%	1131	1091	-4%	-19%	-7%
BTR - Baton Rouge, LA	406,093	\$202.67	\$208.47	3%	946	918	-3%	-18%	-24%
CHS - Charleston, SC	1,283,952	\$185.53	\$190.55	3%	878	914	4%	-4%	6%
CAE - Columbia, SC	487,255	\$224.05	\$229.13	2%	931	958	3%	-28%	-23%
GSO - Greensboro, NC	888,257	\$178.72	\$181.34	1%	851	850	0%	-28%	-21%
MDT - Harrisburg, PA	652,843	\$210.13	\$211.39	1%	1115	1103	-1%	-7%	-2%
FAT - Fresno, CA	640,350	\$197.38	\$196.83	0%	1105	1239	12%	-25%	-17%
SBA - Santa Barbara, CA	370,600	\$205.13	\$203.24	-1%	1225	1382	13%	-25%	-21%
DSM - Des Moines, IA	1,018,004	\$197.16	\$194.88	-1%	987	991	0%	-22%	-4%
HSV - Huntsville/Decatur, AL	578,993	\$230.64	\$226.83	-2%	932	913	-2%	-18%	-2%
COS - Colorado Springs, CO	836,924	\$181.07	\$177.94	-2%	1013	1008	0%	-24%	-14%
LEX - Lexington, KY	535,347	\$200.20	\$196.47	-2%	839	820	-2%	-19%	-4%
PSP - Palm Springs, CA	867,718	\$185.66	\$181.89	-2%	1247	1222	-2%	-11%	-9%
ICT - Wichita, KS	734,647	\$193.02	\$188.10	-3%	959	948	-1%	-26%	-18%
STT - St. Thomas, VI	649,691	\$222.15	\$215.89	-3%	1585	1527	-4%	-9%	-8%
TYS - Knoxville, TN	846,189	\$201.24	\$194.53	-3%	891	888	0%	-19%	-17%
BIL - Billings, MT	440,275	\$199.46	\$190.85	-4%	992	990	0%	-15%	-9%
GUM - Guam, TR	1,477,926	\$639.57	\$606.27	-5%	4259	3897	-9%	-4%	0%
BGR - Bangor, ME	239,908	\$230.61	\$217.22	-6%	1283	1261	-2%	-31%	3%
VPS - Fort Walton Beach, FL	373,542	\$228.96	\$215.35	-6%	945	983	4%	-4%	-9%
SFB - Orlando-Sanford, FL	865,768	\$87.99	\$82.63	-6%	790	842	7%	49%	52%
EUG - Eugene, OR	407,098	\$184.04	\$171.58	-7%	1099	1140	4%	-20%	-4%
PIE - St. Petersburg, FL	436,024	\$95.67	\$88.26	-8%	891	871	-2%	-1%	-6%
FSD - Sioux Falls, SD	453,057	\$211.75	\$194.59	-8%	1011	998	-1%	4%	0%
GSN - Saipan, TR	411,735	\$165.98	\$151.73	-9%	895	732	-18%	#N/A	#N/A
BZN - Bozeman, MT	434,038	\$228.65	\$201.99	-12%	1180	1138	-4%	-9%	4%
MYR - Myrtle Beach, SC	722,775	\$140.75	\$121.07	-14%	727	723	-1%	-15%	-9%
GSP - Greenville/Spartanburg, SC	936,288	\$205.33	\$176.15	-14%	839	803	-4%	-15%	10%
BLI - Bellingham, WA	574,287	\$149.87	\$124.24	-17%	1086	1282	18%	20%	108%
LGB - Long Beach, CA	1,554,844	\$144.24	\$112.52	-22%	1365	856	-37%	1%	1%
ACY - Atlantic City, NJ	663,277	\$105.65	\$62.05	-41%	947	876	-8%	-5%	23%
Grand Total (Small-Hubs)	60,058,848	\$178.63	\$188.83	5.7%	1026.7	1035.4	0.9%	-18.2%	-13.5%

Appendix D: Summary of Changes in Fares for Non-Hub and Essential Air Service Airports

Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
LWT - Lewistown, MT	343	\$80.72	\$226.37	180%	176	97	-45%	0%	0%
JLN - Joplin, MO	24,489	\$114.24	\$221.21	94%	454	803	77%	-49%	25%
VEL - Vernal, UT	7,252	\$122.75	\$226.12	84%	290	928	220%	46%	46%
DEC - Decatur, IL	7,753	\$110.82	\$202.21	82%	409	880	115%	29%	-36%
SOW - Show Low, AZ	3,852	\$94.31	\$164.04	74%	217	645	197%	29%	29%
GRO - Rota, TR	13,206	\$71.88	\$118.82	65%	217	608	222%	#N/A	#N/A
MCK - Mc Cook, NE	1,623	\$124.71	\$205.28	65%	276	914	231%	65%	65%
MOD - Modesto, CA	14,739	\$114.24	\$181.02	58%	951	1341	41%	-58%	-58%
MLS - Miles City, MT	360	\$80.47	\$127.04	58%	143	412	188%	-8%	-8%
IPL - El Centro/Imperial, CA	5,491	\$110.54	\$172.30	56%	649	975	50%	-44%	-44%
CNY - Moab, UT	4,035	\$141.17	\$219.70	56%	418	968	131%	51%	51%
ROW - Roswell, NM	34,598	\$161.25	\$249.26	55%	611	911	49%	-11%	57%
PRC - Prescott, AZ	5,152	\$119.08	\$182.62	53%	494	760	54%	-28%	-28%
IGM - Kingman, AZ	924	\$113.63	\$172.26	52%	357	933	161%	-25%	-25%
HVR - Havre, MT	1,186	\$101.62	\$150.02	48%	193	295	53%	0%	0%
FOD - Fort Dodge, IA	5,625	\$144.22	\$209.37	45%	549	910	66%	7%	-23%
MAZ - Mayaguez, PR	5,856	\$78.51	\$113.80	45%	355	353	0%	-6%	-6%
FKL - Franklin, PA	1,319	\$165.36	\$239.59	45%	693	1112	60%	56%	56%
ISN - Williston, ND	40,658	\$209.08	\$301.34	44%	573	957	67%	123%	142%
ACV - Eureka/Arcata, CA	61,705	\$170.64	\$243.93	43%	822	1130	37%	-25%	-45%
ART - Watertown, NY	16,988	\$166.42	\$236.90	42%	570	1420	149%	-70%	-31%
ESC - Escanaba, MI	13,480	\$175.98	\$248.87	41%	805	1023	27%	24%	226%
HON - Huron, SD	1,705	\$148.28	\$207.66	40%	562	630	12%	-4%	-26%
BKW - Beckley, WV	2,533	\$143.86	\$201.41	40%	349	711	104%	-35%	5%
DIK - Dickinson, ND	23,729	\$180.01	\$251.57	40%	503	986	96%	-14%	-14%
MCE - Merced, CA	3,724	\$111.53	\$155.68	40%	383	1077	181%	-17%	-17%
KSM - St. Mary's, AK	12,711	\$88.07	\$122.14	39%	156	287	84%	-3%	27%
CIC - Chico, CA	19,269	\$117.64	\$162.40	38%	1023	1254	23%	-6%	-6%
PGA - Page, AZ	23,462	\$155.74	\$213.82	37%	460	1095	138%	67%	62%
SAW - Marquette, MI	38,294	\$197.18	\$266.85	35%	911	993	9%	#N/A	#N/A
GRI - Grand Island, NE	56,122	\$107.02	\$144.73	35%	312	959	207%	-43%	113%
SWF - Newburgh, NY	185,389	\$130.70	\$176.33	35%	1072	1092	2%	-49%	-65%
HOM - Homer, AK	39,167	\$91.37	\$122.89	34%	338	325	-4%	-15%	-9%
CEC - Crescent City, CA	12,547	\$134.90	\$181.41	34%	834	928	11%	-4%	-4%
COU - Columbia, MO	41,357	\$140.78	\$188.53	34%	438	811	85%	-26%	94%
CRQ - Carlsbad, CA	48,474	\$114.07	\$151.77	33%	1016	1609	58%	#N/A	#N/A
IMT - Iron Mountain, MI	8,755	\$169.37	\$223.01	32%	741	552	-26%	-45%	45%
GRB - Green Bay, WI	282,870	\$191.44	\$251.73	31%	1032	970	-6%	-32%	-39%

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Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
BPT - Beaumont/Pt. Arthur, TX	5,571	\$225.09	\$294.66	31%	897	917	2%	-60%	-63%
CRP - Corpus Christi, TX	313,939	\$166.71	\$217.65	31%	808	843	4%	-21%	-19%
LAR - Laramie, WY	8,131	\$170.29	\$222.20	30%	493	780	58%	-9%	-5%
VOS - Vieques, PR	56,266	\$97.04	\$126.57	30%	408	550	35%	21%	-9%
ELY - Ely, NV	534	\$118.61	\$154.41	30%	229	1265	453%	4%	4%
MCW - Mason City, IA	6,027	\$189.05	\$244.05	29%	956	854	-11%	-30%	-53%
GGW - Glasgow, MT	1,975	\$89.11	\$114.93	29%	241	236	-2%	-7%	-7%
GBD - Great Bend, KS	943	\$138.25	\$177.82	29%	315	998	217%	-18%	-18%
SHD - Shenandoah Valley, VA	15,179	\$155.43	\$197.79	27%	423	1016	140%	32%	107%
IFP - Bullhead City, AZ	109,405	\$128.14	\$162.40	27%	1181	1114	-6%	-100%	-100%
DBQ - Dubuque, IA	32,389	\$179.15	\$226.51	26%	969	1029	6%	-28%	-34%
BMI - Bloomington, IL	240,153	\$144.83	\$182.99	26%	882	897	2%	-25%	-22%
MMV - Martha's Vineyard, MA	50,464	\$96.16	\$121.41	26%	241	248	3%	3%	4%
HRL - Harlingen, TX	375,472	\$130.59	\$164.68	26%	679	701	3%	-27%	-28%
ATY - Watertown, SD	6,296	\$183.43	\$228.68	25%	443	905	104%	-27%	-48%
OME - Nome, AK	59,807	\$153.67	\$190.86	24%	499	547	10%	15%	-1%
RDD - Redding, CA	29,175	\$166.05	\$205.47	24%	714	1224	71%	-46%	-70%
VIS - Visalia, CA	3,354	\$120.22	\$147.58	23%	402	1555	287%	17%	17%
HOT - Hot Springs, AR	2,452	\$90.36	\$110.63	22%	241	225	-6%	-12%	-59%
SHR - Sheridan, WY	12,889	\$186.88	\$228.36	22%	649	1036	60%	-50%	-47%
VCT - Victoria, TX	4,597	\$212.06	\$258.71	22%	912	1030	13%	-40%	-50%
DDC - Dodge City, KS	5,784	\$166.16	\$202.30	22%	481	876	82%	-24%	-24%
JHW - Jamestown, NY	3,173	\$190.28	\$230.71	21%	761	807	6%	3%	-42%
CWA - Wausau, WI	120,449	\$209.27	\$252.68	21%	1011	1018	1%	-37%	-21%
CVN - Clovis, NM	1,694	\$152.97	\$184.60	21%	332	775	133%	-16%	-16%
FMN - Farmington, NM	16,337	\$178.15	\$214.19	20%	507	913	80%	-25%	-25%
AOO - Altoona, PA	3,256	\$160.74	\$193.22	20%	561	1022	82%	-16%	11%
VBZ - Valdez, AK	16,087	\$110.92	\$133.22	20%	305	273	-10%	74%	18%
GCK - Garden City, KS	17,998	\$175.06	\$209.54	20%	561	948	69%	-34%	9%
DVL - Devils Lake, ND	2,976	\$292.76	\$350.19	20%	683	1045	53%	53%	-14%
SJT - San Angelo, TX	56,301	\$204.63	\$244.23	19%	941	964	2%	-45%	-29%
GDV - Glendive, MT	746	\$114.60	\$136.68	19%	220	231	5%	-13%	-13%
AZO - Kalamazoo, MI	127,517	\$214.22	\$254.20	19%	944	937	-1%	-38%	-39%
NYL - Yuma, AZ	81,371	\$213.77	\$253.25	18%	1039	1238	19%	#N/A	#N/A
ABI - Abilene, TX	74,521	\$199.60	\$236.04	18%	933	928	-1%	-33%	-26%
RST - Rochester, MN	105,365	\$190.25	\$224.79	18%	907	881	-3%	-37%	-45%
JMS - Jamestown, ND	3,544	\$224.69	\$265.27	18%	651	902	39%	84%	37%
CDV - Cordova, AK	16,061	\$174.38	\$205.35	18%	711	754	6%	-2%	-12%
CLL - College Station, TX	70,352	\$195.93	\$228.82	17%	991	942	-5%	-30%	-8%
HIB - Hibbing, MN	11,771	\$205.69	\$240.12	17%	900	1157	29%	-25%	11%
DUT - Dutch Harbor, AK	30,735	\$501.63	\$582.52	16%	1478	1812	23%	-60%	-82%

Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
LBL - Liberal, KS	5,816	\$175.66	\$203.83	16%	522	772	48%	14%	14%
LNK - Lincoln, NE	134,772	\$198.36	\$229.35	16%	868	832	-4%	-25%	-30%
SDY - Sidney, MT	11,858	\$137.68	\$158.88	15%	259	381	47%	7%	7%
BRO - Brownsville, TX	85,416	\$218.10	\$251.53	15%	1074	1087	1%	-1%	3%
CMI - Champaign, IL	86,287	\$197.20	\$227.19	15%	933	1025	10%	-35%	-34%
OGS - Ogdensburg, NY	5,033	\$109.18	\$125.69	15%	440	340	-23%	-15%	-60%
WRL - World, WY	2,795	\$173.62	\$199.70	15%	444	981	121%	-2%	-2%
BFL - Bakersfield, CA	152,431	\$220.32	\$253.29	15%	1160	1356	17%	-27%	-23%
IPT - Williamsport, PA	25,960	\$223.48	\$256.66	15%	1076	1148	7%	-40%	-43%
CDR - Chadron, NE	2,037	\$157.93	\$181.22	15%	448	961	114%	34%	34%
MTJ - Montrose, CO	75,296	\$207.91	\$237.54	14%	1199	1182	-1%	-34%	-16%
TXK - Texarkana, AR	28,080	\$250.75	\$286.43	14%	879	879	0%	-44%	-36%
ACT - Waco, TX	59,706	\$189.15	\$215.30	14%	977	943	-3%	-39%	-10%
TVC - Traverse City, MI	179,879	\$210.56	\$239.44	14%	1014	1023	1%	-2%	-18%
CIU - Sault Ste. Marie, MI	19,824	\$225.35	\$256.24	14%	757	1074	42%	-10%	32%
GGG - Longview, TX	18,787	\$188.87	\$214.23	13%	916	885	-3%	-38%	1%
PIR - Pierre, SD	11,740	\$215.12	\$243.99	13%	637	961	51%	-2%	-23%
MSS - Massena, NY	4,964	\$114.22	\$129.54	13%	432	399	-8%	17%	-45%
ATW - Appleton, WI	229,246	\$201.80	\$228.35	13%	964	1018	6%	-44%	-26%
UNV - State College, PA	133,789	\$216.90	\$245.07	13%	1058	1147	8%	#N/A	#N/A
OTZ - Kottbus, AK	63,032	\$146.55	\$165.36	13%	411	387	-6%	45%	3%
GRK - Killen, TX	183,501	\$226.02	\$254.11	12%	1042	1111	7%	-17%	-7%
FSM - Fort Smith, AR	84,751	\$220.27	\$247.34	12%	872	901	3%	-31%	-24%
UNK - Unalakleet, AK	13,070	\$130.40	\$146.03	12%	256	350	37%	102%	178%
TYR - Tyler, TX	71,841	\$195.50	\$218.35	12%	937	897	-4%	-21%	1%
GUC - Gunnison, CO	31,181	\$191.18	\$213.32	12%	1050	974	-7%	-53%	-33%
MLU - Monroe, LA	101,034	\$220.74	\$246.04	11%	923	907	-2%	-35%	-15%
HXD - Hilton Head Island, SC	60,372	\$199.38	\$222.18	11%	810	818	1%	#N/A	#N/A
EVV - Evansville, IN	164,681	\$212.46	\$236.46	11%	821	827	1%	-39%	-35%
LSE - La Crosse, WI	97,319	\$239.72	\$265.67	11%	1018	989	-3%	-15%	-29%
SBN - South Bend, IN	299,482	\$169.73	\$187.40	10%	973	1015	4%	-36%	-25%
DRT - Del Rio, TX	11,632	\$223.11	\$246.29	10%	1009	1018	1%	-29%	-11%
DLG - Dillingham, AK	28,521	\$206.65	\$227.76	10%	651	396	-39%	-43%	-23%
TUP - Tupelo, MS	8,191	\$237.21	\$261.38	10%	732	454	-38%	-46%	-34%
SPS - Wichita Falls, TX	38,836	\$249.64	\$274.37	10%	933	930	0%	-44%	-6%
ALS - Alamosa, CO	6,959	\$172.92	\$190.02	10%	548	859	57%	13%	13%
CEZ - Cortez, CO	7,548	\$174.95	\$192.14	10%	562	1079	92%	22%	22%
LFT - Lafayette, LA	226,453	\$218.27	\$239.35	10%	941	951	1%	-12%	4%
PVC - Provincetown, MA	11,577	\$71.29	\$78.09	10%	146	185	27%	0%	0%
TVF - Thief River Falls, MN	2,819	\$188.92	\$206.43	9%	602	765	27%	38%	28%
JAC - Jackson Hole, WY	274,342	\$232.36	\$253.89	9%	1349	1286	-5%	-10%	-6%

Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
ELM - Elmira, NY	145,262	\$181.58	\$197.88	9%	1001	1082	8%	-6%	29%
SVC - Silver City, NM	1,363	\$125.01	\$136.21	9%	256	684	167%	7%	7%
AVP - Wilkes-Barre/Scranton, PA	219,540	\$201.44	\$219.42	9%	1170	1129	-4%	-2%	5%
IWD - Ironwood, MI	2,532	\$161.64	\$175.93	9%	527	941	78%	-4%	13%
CYS - Cheyenne, WY	15,010	\$206.31	\$223.93	9%	635	814	28%	-19%	-21%
OLF - Wolf Point, MT	2,987	\$129.29	\$140.09	8%	234	383	64%	-3%	-3%
HYS - Hays, KS	9,328	\$198.21	\$214.72	8%	602	854	42%	51%	51%
OTH - North Bend, OR	18,283	\$171.30	\$185.55	8%	653	775	19%	25%	-35%
AEX - Alexandria, LA	189,476	\$232.44	\$251.07	8%	945	924	-2%	-22%	-11%
BFF - Scottsbluff, NE	9,839	\$172.64	\$186.39	8%	504	877	74%	37%	37%
PIB - Laurel/Hattiesburg, MS	13,857	\$235.72	\$254.43	8%	758	436	-43%	-12%	18%
EAR - Kearney, NE	12,467	\$187.21	\$201.91	8%	688	908	32%	33%	-1%
LCH - Lake Charles, LA	56,762	\$232.43	\$250.67	8%	932	938	1%	15%	30%
BRD - Brainerd, MN	15,630	\$218.58	\$235.66	8%	954	1051	10%	-64%	-47%
MFE - McAllen, TX	327,615	\$199.25	\$214.76	8%	1032	1049	2%	-21%	-22%
SBP - San Luis Obispo, CA	127,334	\$202.88	\$218.59	8%	1179	1385	17%	-30%	-31%
AKN - King Salmon, AK	35,803	\$224.23	\$240.42	7%	642	434	-32%	41%	17%
VLD - Valdosta, GA	37,030	\$224.33	\$240.32	7%	1014	960	-5%	-2%	-5%
LAW - Lawton, OK	55,678	\$247.63	\$265.29	7%	972	979	1%	-20%	18%
PIA - Peoria, IL	286,372	\$175.51	\$187.95	7%	1038	995	-4%	-1%	1%
HVN - New Haven, CT	36,971	\$189.27	\$202.22	7%	1055	1103	5%	-40%	-29%
TLH - Tallahassee, FL	331,197	\$202.56	\$216.00	7%	804	877	9%	-35%	-31%
LRD - Laredo, TX	102,222	\$201.52	\$214.05	6%	980	999	2%	-14%	-6%
DAB - Daytona Beach, FL	290,144	\$151.87	\$161.26	6%	982	958	-3%	-25%	-22%
MBS - Saginaw, MI	134,571	\$198.02	\$209.81	6%	1001	968	-3%	-7%	-32%
ALO - Waterloo, IA	19,470	\$214.45	\$226.99	6%	977	948	-3%	-50%	-40%
HBN - Steamboat Springs, CO	99,969	\$190.34	\$201.13	6%	1205	1150	-5%	-33%	-20%
SHV - Shreveport, LA	276,435	\$228.95	\$241.62	6%	932	952	2%	-23%	-15%
LAN - Lansing, MI	200,703	\$180.02	\$188.94	5%	996	793	-20%	-16%	-21%
BRW - Barrow, AK	43,673	\$235.39	\$246.77	5%	721	835	16%	14%	0%
BIS - Bismarck, ND	239,014	\$229.48	\$240.20	5%	1018	1023	0%	24%	6%
RDM - Redmond, OR	229,736	\$164.18	\$171.75	5%	933	1014	9%	-34%	-14%
ERI - Erie, PA	106,084	\$178.04	\$185.63	4%	881	960	9%	-35%	-30%
LWS - Lewiston, ID	62,197	\$180.41	\$187.80	4%	769	839	9%	-44%	-8%
ENA - Kenai, AK	99,814	\$106.17	\$110.19	4%	313	287	-8%	17%	5%
PUW - Pullman, WA	38,547	\$156.09	\$161.84	4%	527	637	21%	-36%	31%
ANI - Aniak, AK	15,220	\$115.67	\$119.87	4%	225	241	7%	-33%	-25%
STS - Santa Rosa, CA	105,728	\$125.52	\$130.00	4%	525	543	3%	92%	97%
JBR - Jonesboro, AR	4,730	\$143.38	\$148.42	4%	335	852	154%	50%	-26%
ADQ - Kodiak, AK	78,749	\$200.27	\$207.12	3%	722	784	9%	57%	-4%
PLN - Pellston, MI	24,864	\$254.25	\$262.67	3%	917	996	9%	-34%	-19%

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Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
BGM - Binghamton, NY	102,436	\$195.97	\$202.44	3%	1116	1183	6%	-20%	-21%
BRL - Burlington, IA	7,887	\$167.40	\$172.77	3%	697	899	29%	208%	54%
FHR - Friday Harbor, WA	7,802	\$45.11	\$46.55	3%	63	77	22%	#N/A	#N/A
EGE - Vail/Eagle, CO	167,901	\$223.58	\$230.61	3%	1262	1301	3%	-36%	-21%
ROA - Roanoke, VA	315,548	\$209.14	\$214.65	3%	880	906	3%	-20%	-17%
BQK - Brunswick, GA	31,284	\$212.86	\$217.18	2%	926	883	-5%	-4%	11%
PQI - Presque Isle, ME	12,412	\$270.91	\$276.40	2%	1155	878	-24%	-18%	18%
PGG - Pago Pago, TR	49,213	\$611.07	\$620.65	2%	3618	3541	-2%	7%	7%
BFD - Bradford, PA	2,310	\$211.19	\$212.83	1%	792	926	17%	-31%	-61%
DLH - Duluth, MN	158,569	\$202.92	\$204.32	1%	1086	1060	-2%	-1%	-22%
MOB - Mobile, AL	277,430	\$239.54	\$241.01	1%	937	952	2%	-13%	-11%
RAP - Rapid City, SD	252,578	\$233.34	\$234.77	1%	995	986	-1%	6%	1%
MEI - Meridian, MS	14,432	\$284.48	\$286.17	1%	866	400	-54%	3%	3%
BFI - Seattle, WA	23,072	\$47.27	\$47.45	0%	71	74	4%	-60%	-62%
MHK - Manhattan, KS	68,955	\$224.76	\$225.55	0%	648	822	27%	32%	238%
SPI - Springfield, IL	64,872	\$191.15	\$191.63	0%	895	918	3%	-19%	-4%
DUJ - Du Bois, PA	5,074	\$209.94	\$210.46	0%	898	1060	18%	15%	15%
MOT - Minot, ND	222,159	\$277.20	\$277.86	0%	1138	1109	-3%	268%	144%
PGV - Greenville, NC	61,968	\$190.28	\$190.63	0%	818	850	4%	-1%	6%
CHA - Chattanooga, TN	313,783	\$193.97	\$192.67	-1%	786	776	-1%	-8%	-3%
LMT - Klamath Falls, OR	15,237	\$190.07	\$188.79	-1%	658	1107	68%	-28%	-42%
SUX - Sioux City, IA	27,168	\$212.63	\$211.19	-1%	879	827	-6%	-63%	-57%
SUN - Sun Valley, ID	47,734	\$195.93	\$194.38	-1%	789	852	8%	-49%	-46%
FLG - Flagstaff, AZ	62,472	\$208.34	\$206.45	-1%	998	972	-3%	19%	40%
JNU - Juneau, AK	301,681	\$203.18	\$200.96	-1%	1020	938	-8%	-26%	-10%
RKS - Rock Springs, WY	28,270	\$225.46	\$222.67	-1%	654	880	35%	35%	83%
RIW - Riverton, WY	13,136	\$229.72	\$226.85	-1%	704	974	38%	1%	-9%
FWA - Fort Wayne, IN	280,732	\$207.85	\$205.06	-1%	954	958	0%	-33%	-22%
EYW - Key West, FL	370,637	\$197.05	\$193.89	-2%	934	1023	10%	-28%	12%
ASE - Aspen, CO	214,892	\$255.19	\$249.64	-2%	1143	1116	-2%	-2%	16%
FAR - Fargo, ND	370,099	\$232.90	\$227.79	-2%	1057	1112	5%	15%	12%
ACK - Nantucket, MA	178,918	\$87.55	\$85.56	-2%	176	100	-43%	-17%	-13%
PKB - Parkersburg, WV	8,292	\$227.88	\$222.37	-2%	636	727	14%	52%	-15%
MGM - Montgomery, AL	182,313	\$236.02	\$229.80	-3%	893	922	3%	-1%	-5%
CRW - Charleston, WV	270,537	\$212.92	\$206.86	-3%	888	916	3%	-27%	-13%
GPI - Kalispell/Glacier, MT	192,437	\$231.82	\$225.14	-3%	1201	1177	-2%	#N/A	#N/A
ABY - Albany, GA	33,494	\$254.61	\$247.15	-3%	880	868	-1%	-24%	-10%
SGF - Springfield, MO	364,665	\$211.12	\$204.81	-3%	923	975	6%	-31%	-28%
PSE - Ponce, PR	95,787	\$149.55	\$144.59	-3%	1500	1384	-8%	-68%	-29%
AIA - Alliance, NE	1,592	\$155.71	\$150.46	-3%	404	755	87%	-12%	-12%
MFR - Medford, OR	313,638	\$180.16	\$173.84	-4%	1021	1007	-1%	-39%	-18%

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Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
GNV - Gainesville, FL	190,324	\$211.49	\$203.83	-4%	942	959	2%	18%	15%
HLN - Helena, MT	95,374	\$245.95	\$236.83	-4%	978	1154	18%	-19%	0%
EAT - Wenatchee, WA	51,347	\$172.27	\$165.79	-4%	814	885	9%	0%	40%
EWN - New Bern, NC	125,873	\$204.07	\$195.95	-4%	974	1008	4%	11%	9%
YKM - Yakima, WA	57,673	\$189.42	\$181.60	-4%	956	955	0%	-14%	-11%
GTR - Columbus, MS	38,693	\$258.22	\$246.60	-4%	841	849	1%	0%	18%
ITH - Ithaca, NY	117,045	\$203.99	\$194.57	-5%	992	1226	24%	-5%	7%
IDA - Idaho Falls, ID	160,454	\$213.50	\$202.87	-5%	911	962	6%	-25%	-12%
BET - Bethel, AK	148,168	\$154.79	\$146.77	-5%	466	365	-22%	200%	114%
TOL - Toledo, OH	78,755	\$171.93	\$162.74	-5%	855	886	4%	-75%	-64%
YNG - Youngstown, OH	40,102	\$85.89	\$81.07	-6%	861	895	4%	213%	218%
MSL - Muscle Shoals, AL	4,160	\$184.99	\$173.83	-6%	465	232	-50%	-35%	-13%
CNM - Carlsbad, NM	2,776	\$140.03	\$131.47	-6%	263	302	15%	36%	-34%
SBY - Salisbury, MD	76,370	\$179.13	\$167.80	-6%	920	981	7%	-19%	-6%
DHN - Dothan, AL	46,452	\$335.78	\$314.00	-6%	977	996	2%	-17%	-15%
SGU - St. George, UT	53,977	\$113.99	\$106.58	-6%	547	569	4%	-44%	-19%
IRK - Kirksville, MO	5,744	\$128.45	\$119.69	-7%	349	387	11%	-12%	-58%
CHO - Charlottesville, VA	226,396	\$221.26	\$205.26	-7%	926	997	8%	-10%	-1%
GJT - Grand Junction, CO	217,369	\$222.32	\$206.19	-7%	832	970	16%	-12%	18%
TBN - Ft. Leonard Wood, MO	7,894	\$216.01	\$199.99	-7%	725	563	-22%	319%	99%
BQN - Aguadilla, PR	215,448	\$163.85	\$151.67	-7%	1451	1413	-3%	3%	6%
MSO - Missoula, MT	303,886	\$217.91	\$201.37	-8%	1088	1076	-1%	-28%	-12%
JST - Johnstown, PA	6,986	\$228.13	\$210.47	-8%	924	1123	21%	-17%	-17%
GST - Gustavus, AK	9,509	\$135.36	\$123.49	-9%	605	46	-92%	11%	27%
LBF - North Platte, NE	9,017	\$220.04	\$200.34	-9%	630	819	30%	1%	1%
MCN - Macon, GA	843	\$248.14	\$225.52	-9%	955	816	-15%	36%	-80%
SLK - Saranac Lake, NY	6,018	\$161.58	\$146.02	-10%	550	517	-6%	-9%	-57%
SCC - Prudhoe Bay/Deadhorse, AK	43,837	\$313.11	\$282.35	-10%	626	454	-28%	-12%	-19%
AVL - Asheville, NC	318,371	\$217.80	\$196.25	-10%	878	869	-1%	-4%	6%
ALW - Walla Walla, WA	31,832	\$168.17	\$151.21	-10%	676	716	6%	-41%	25%
MRY - Monterey, CA	196,268	\$220.25	\$197.53	-10%	1184	1148	-3%	-30%	-17%
YAK - Yakutat, AK	10,100	\$186.57	\$167.06	-10%	797	489	-39%	0%	-10%
LUP - Kalaupapa/ Molokai, HI	3,186	\$44.37	\$39.64	-11%	41	164	295%	1%	1%
TEX - Telluride, CO	7,828	\$265.65	\$236.25	-11%	828	1052	27%	-46%	-53%
COD - Cody, WY	28,551	\$238.79	\$212.29	-11%	958	933	-3%	-31%	-5%
RFD - Rockford, IL	106,412	\$123.57	\$109.84	-11%	1190	1190	0%	-46%	-20%
DRO - Durango, CO	186,567	\$220.53	\$194.41	-12%	926	832	-10%	3%	49%
INL - International Falls, MN	15,240	\$249.56	\$219.00	-12%	880	628	-29%	-39%	-18%
TRI - Tri-Cities, TN	206,784	\$229.17	\$201.10	-12%	838	879	5%	-33%	-20%
PSC - Pasco, WA	329,833	\$211.78	\$185.09	-13%	1079	1077	0%	-11%	23%
LWB - Greenbrier, WV	9,566	\$247.76	\$216.23	-13%	713	571	-20%	-33%	-10%

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Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
SAF - Santa Fe, NM	47,847	\$250.57	\$218.34	-13%	857	963	12%	32%	222%
FAY - Fayetteville, NC	255,247	\$257.76	\$224.29	-13%	933	1051	13%	24%	31%
GAL - Galena, AK	14,563	\$131.25	\$113.91	-13%	240	220	-8%	1%	-16%
PIH - Pocatello, ID	22,214	\$185.85	\$160.88	-13%	549	572	4%	-50%	-41%
SMX - Santa Maria, CA	44,737	\$175.92	\$152.24	-13%	944	1018	8%	-20%	-14%
CMX - Hancock, MI	25,545	\$214.07	\$184.96	-14%	1082	974	-10%	-32%	-14%
CLM - Port Angeles, WA	5,853	\$49.83	\$42.80	-14%	69	70	2%	-66%	-67%
MWA - Marion, IL	11,354	\$136.79	\$117.19	-14%	390	395	1%	98%	-6%
KTN - Ketchikan, AK	103,136	\$227.46	\$194.40	-15%	980	575	-41%	16%	23%
CSG - Columbus, GA	74,336	\$310.53	\$264.85	-15%	958	975	2%	51%	24%
OAJ - Jacksonville, NC	174,276	\$255.14	\$217.53	-15%	1027	1048	2%	16%	22%
HRO - Harrison, AR	5,347	\$131.23	\$111.49	-15%	279	207	-26%	28%	-40%
SIT - Sitka, AK	68,218	\$204.80	\$173.03	-16%	971	517	-47%	-6%	-6%
LYH - Lynchburg, VA	79,889	\$253.45	\$212.72	-16%	928	977	5%	-12%	0%
ELD - El Dorado, AR	3,059	\$137.36	\$115.16	-16%	254	219	-14%	0%	-52%
GTF - Great Falls, MT	186,776	\$232.95	\$195.17	-16%	1078	1032	-4%	-8%	-7%
BTM - Butte, MT	20,895	\$223.93	\$186.20	-17%	832	762	-8%	-55%	-63%
APN - Alpena, MI	13,011	\$247.15	\$205.21	-17%	760	654	-14%	-43%	-16%
SCK - Stockton, CA	63,149	\$63.70	\$52.79	-17%	359	564	57%	75%	78%
EAU - Eau Claire, WI	22,871	\$195.84	\$161.98	-17%	980	818	-17%	-63%	-45%
GCC - Gillette, WY	32,714	\$250.65	\$206.83	-17%	695	868	25%	28%	35%
FLO - Florence, SC	67,745	\$230.71	\$189.81	-18%	830	866	4%	-11%	2%
PBG - Plattsburgh, NY	112,493	\$155.26	\$126.31	-19%	985	1270	29%	186%	1098%
HNH - Hoonah, AK	9,564	\$46.31	\$37.55	-19%	53	41	-23%	-27%	5%
GLH - Greenville, MS	5,181	\$242.87	\$196.27	-19%	809	516	-36%	15%	53%
GFK - Grand Forks, ND	137,923	\$262.41	\$211.88	-19%	1088	1161	7%	33%	16%
AGS - Augusta, GA	271,691	\$252.17	\$203.31	-19%	908	901	-1%	32%	52%
TWF - Twin Falls, ID	26,059	\$190.59	\$153.42	-20%	551	752	27%	-46%	-45%
MLB - Melbourne, FL	215,300	\$204.33	\$164.35	-20%	1069	975	-9%	19%	30%
CKB - Clarksburg, WV	8,921	\$294.31	\$236.00	-20%	939	768	-18%	18%	25%
EKO - Elko, NV	33,308	\$202.35	\$160.99	-20%	567	537	-5%	-45%	-45%
MKG - Muskegon, MI	17,814	\$190.03	\$150.84	-21%	874	740	-15%	-69%	-41%
PAH - Paducah, KY	20,734	\$208.01	\$164.68	-21%	687	819	19%	-33%	-1%
CPR - Casper, WY	88,011	\$260.47	\$204.23	-22%	901	845	-6%	-41%	-12%
RUT - Rutland, VT	5,909	\$157.98	\$123.48	-22%	460	492	7%	69%	-8%
PDT - Pendleton, OR	5,066	\$126.68	\$99.00	-22%	342	182	-47%	16%	-72%
TNI - Tinian, TR	10,203	\$39.16	\$30.48	-22%	15	14	-6%	#N/A	#N/A
SLN - Salina, KS	2,919	\$116.24	\$90.00	-23%	296	161	-46%	24%	-41%
CDC - Cedar City, UT	15,881	\$126.67	\$97.07	-23%	435	398	-9%	-59%	-9%
PUB - Pueblo, CO	9,812	\$168.70	\$128.80	-24%	537	864	61%	98%	134%
UIN - Quincy, IL	10,165	\$156.87	\$119.75	-24%	517	368	-29%	56%	-26%

Airport	Enplaned Pax (2012)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2007)	Avg. One-Way Fare (2012)	% Change Fares 07-12	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2007)	Avg. Itinerary Dist. (2012)	% Change Dist. 07-12	% Change Flights 07-12	% Change Seats 07-12
FNL - Fort Collins, CO	34,817	\$81.31	\$61.52	-24%	628	629	0%	2%	2%
AUG - Augusta, ME	4,791	\$208.50	\$157.59	-24%	764	967	27%	-20%	-62%
STX - St. Croix, VI	200,727	\$219.13	\$162.47	-26%	1175	999	-15%	-15%	-17%
BHB - Bar Harbor, ME	8,862	\$239.25	\$176.94	-26%	684	647	-5%	-19%	-15%
MGW - Morgantown, WV	9,534	\$270.35	\$198.86	-26%	760	892	17%	-2%	-2%
CGI - Cape Girardeau, MO	6,226	\$173.88	\$127.74	-27%	767	379	-51%	292%	85%
LEB - Lebanon, NH	10,189	\$173.21	\$125.95	-27%	477	431	-10%	92%	-27%
LNS - Lancaster, PA	5,779	\$126.94	\$91.05	-28%	589	416	-29%	135%	12%
HTS - Huntington, WV	105,546	\$185.34	\$128.86	-30%	767	776	1%	-5%	41%
EWB - New Bedford, MA	12,254	\$48.36	\$33.49	-31%	50	49	-3%	29%	25%
BJI - Bemidji, MN	22,374	\$251.08	\$170.89	-32%	1052	715	-32%	-60%	-38%
ABR - Aberdeen, SD	24,877	\$260.38	\$175.53	-33%	882	713	-19%	-69%	-52%
RHI - Rhinelander, WI	11,119	\$209.38	\$135.59	-35%	930	635	-32%	-75%	-58%
HYA - Hyannis, MA	95,693	\$57.74	\$35.32	-39%	53	37	-30%	-22%	-27%
PSG - Petersburg, AK	18,800	\$201.62	\$122.52	-39%	835	351	-58%	-27%	-14%
MKK - Molokai/Hoolehua, HI	72,421	\$72.90	\$44.00	-40%	327	108	-67%	-7%	-18%
BID - Block Island, RI	10,643	\$49.83	\$30.00	-40%	17	17	0%	19%	19%
RKD - Rockland, ME	8,160	\$220.81	\$131.13	-41%	785	565	-28%	-22%	-63%
OWB - Owensboro, KY	30,795	\$165.96	\$87.08	-48%	785	681	-13%	509%	984%
WRG - Wrangell, AK	11,434	\$193.65	\$100.54	-48%	743	199	-73%	0%	-12%
LNK - Lanai/Lanai, HI	45,692	\$193.45	\$88.86	-54%	1038	283	-73%	-15%	-22%
AHN - Athens, GA	1,694	\$248.29	\$109.38	-56%	786	260	-67%	4%	-55%
MKL - Jackson, TN	2,037	\$173.78	\$75.00	-57%	519	130	-75%	539%	214%
HGR - Hagerstown, MD	10,207	\$167.59	\$70.93	-58%	565	767	36%	194%	132%
LBE - Latrobe, PA	79,531	\$175.20	\$62.10	-65%	871	871	0%	-19%	275%
Grand Total (Non-Hubs)	22,873,244	\$184.44	\$190.34	3.2%	742.2	814.9	9.8%	-13.9%	-10.6%

Evolving Trends of U.S. Domestic Airfares

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JBLU01907995

Certificate of Service

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Application of JetBlue Airways Corporation was served this 25th day of March, 2014 via email transmission on the following persons:

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/s/

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